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CHAPTER 3 
Domestic Relations 
SURVEY Stafft 
§ 3.1. Divorce-Antenuptial Contracts Governing Alimony or Property 
Rights.* In a majority of states antenuptial contracts governing alimony or 
property rights upon divorce are considered void per se as against public 
policy. • Several reasons have been given for holding these contracts void. 2 
Frequently, the courts have viewed these contracts as facilitating divorce by 
offering one spouse a financial inducement to end the marriage. 3 In addi-
tion, some courts have viewed these contracts as denigrating the status of 
marriage. 4 Still other courts have viewed these contracts as contrary to the 
public's interest in preventing one spouse from becoming a public charge.' 
The current trend, however, is to hold that these contracts are not void per 
se6 and to analyze their validity on a case by case basis. 7 
t Pamela M. Donna, Marl A. Wilson and Kevin J. Lake. 
* Pamela M. Donna, Staff Member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 3.1. 1 See 2 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS,§ 90-33 
(1977) [hereinafter referred to as LINDEY]. 
' See Klarman, Marital Agreements in Contemplation of Divorce, 10 U. MicH. J. L. REF. 
397, 404-05 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as Klarman]. 
' See, e.g., Matthews v. Matthews, 2 N.C. App. 143, 147, 162 S.E.2d 697, 699 (1968); 
Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn. App. 594, 604, 385 S.W.2d 288, 293 (1964). 
• See, e.g., Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 126, 42 N.W.2d 500, 501 (1950). 
' See, e.g., Norris v. Norris, 174 N.W.2d 368, 370 (Iowa 1970). 
• See, e.g., Barnhill v. Barnhill, 386 So.2d 749, 751 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980); Parniawski v. 
Parniawski, 33 Conn. Supp. 44, 47-48, 359 A.2d 719, 720-22 (1976); Burtoff v. Burtoff, 418 
A.2d 1085, 1089 (D.C. App. 1980); Posner v. Posner, 233 So.2d 381, 385 (Fla. 1970); rev'd on 
other grounds, 257 So.2d 530 (1972); Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App.3d 386, 391-92, 286 N.E.2d 42, 
47 (1972); Ferry v. Ferry, 586 S.W.2d 782,786 (Mo. App. 1979); Buettner v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 
39, 45, 505 P.2d 600, 604 (1973); Freeman v. Freeman, 565 P.2d 365, 367 (Okla. 1977); 
Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 107, 506 P.2d 719, 721 (1973). 
New York permits these contracts by statute. See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw§ 236B(3) (Consol. 
1981-82). 
Several other jurisdictions recognize the validity of antenuptial contracts governing property 
rights upon divorce, but have not recently ruled on the validity of those governing alimony 
rights. See, e.g., Spectorv. Spector, 23 Ariz. App.131, 136,531 P.2d 176,181 (1975); Tomlin-
son v. Tomlinson, 170 Ind. App. 331, 340, 352 N.E.2d 785, 791 (1976); In reMarriage of 
Cohn, 18 Wash. App. 502, 569 P.2d 79 (1977); Laird v. Laird, 597 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 1979). 
' See, e.g., Burtoff v. Burtoff, 418 A.2d 1085, 1089 (D.C. App. 1980). 
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During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court, in Osborne v. 
Osborne, • addressed the issue of whether antenuptial contracts governing 
rights upon divorce would be treated as not void per se. 9 The Court had not 
previously ruled on the validity of these contracts. 10 In Osborne, in connec-
tion with a divorce sought by both parties, the husband sought alimony and 
a division of property under the state's equitable distribution statute. 11 In 
addition, the husband sought to establish an ownership interest in real prop-
erty held in joint title form. 12 Rather than ruling on the validity of an 
antenuptial contract in which the parties had waived all claims to one 
another's property and to alimony in the event of divorce, 13 the probate 
court denied the husband's claim for alimony and a division of property on 
• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 428 N.E.2d 810. 
' Jd. at 2220, 428 N.E,2d at 814. 
to Id. 
" Jd. at 2217, 428 N.E.2d at 812. The equitable distribution statute, G.L. c. 208, § 34 pro-
vides: 
Upon divorce or upon motion in an action brought at any time after a divorce, the court 
may make a judgment for either of the parties to pay alimony to the other. In addition 
to or in lieu of a judgment to pay alimony, the court may fSSign to either husband or 
wife all or any part of the estate of the other. In determining the amount of alimony, if 
any, to be paid, or in fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be so as-
signed, the court, after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party, shall consider the 
length of the marriage, the conduct of the parties during the marriage, the age, health, 
station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, 
estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future 
acquisition of capital assets and income. The court may also consider the contribution 
of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their 
respective estates and the contribution of each of the parties as a homemaker to the 
family unit. 
Under this statute all property of either spouse, including that acquired before marriage and 
that acquired by gift or inheritance, is subject to distribution. See, e.g., Rice v. Rice, 372 Mass. 
398, 400, 361 N.E.2d 1305, 1307 (1977). 
12 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2217, 428 N.E.2d at 812. 
" Id. at 2218-19, 428 N.E.2d at 813. The contract provided in relevant part that: 
neither, upon or subsequent to said marriage, shall acquire any interest, right or claim 
in or to the property ... which the other now owns, possesses or is entitled to, or which 
the other may own, possess, or become entitled to hereafter 
and that in the event of divorce ''neither shall be entitled to any alimony, support money ... or 
to any other money by virtue thereof." Jd. at 2219, 428 N.E.2d at 813. 
The contract was executed several hours before the wedding. Jd. At that time, the prospec-
tive husband and wife were medical students. Id. at 2218,428 N.E.2d at 813. The wife is heiress 
to a family fortune of approximately $17,000,000. Id. An accurate schedule disclosing her 
worth and expected inheritance was attached to the agreement. Jd. at 2219,428 N.E.2dat 813. 
The husband had no significant assets at that time. I d. The contract, however, stated that the 
husband, "by reason of his becoming a member of the medical profession, contemplates that 
he will have adequate earning power for his own support .... '' Jd. Both the husband and wife 
were practicing physicians when the Supreme Judicial Court decided this case. Id. at 2220, 428 
N.E.2d at 814. 
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the ground that he was not in need of either. 14 The probate court found, 
however, that the husband was joint owner of the real estate held in joint 
title form.~~ 
Both parties appealed the trial court's decision, and the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted the wife's application for direct appellate review. 16 The wife 
claimed that the trial court had erred in failing to give full effect to the 
antenuptial contract and in striking a master's report finding that she was 
sole owner of the real estate held in joint title form. 17 The Supreme Judicial 
Court sustained the wife's claims, concluding that the antenuptial contract 
was controlling on all claims of the husband. 18 In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court held that "an antenuptial contract settling the alimony or proper-
ty rights of the parties upon divorce is not per se against public policy and 
may be specifically enforced." 19 
This holding was based on the Osborne Court's recognition that a 
changed public policy toward divorce allowed couples to divorce more free-
ly. 20 The Legislature itself, the Court noted, had removed significant 
obstacles to divorce by abolishing the doctrine of recrimination21 as a 
'' /d. at 2218, 428 N.E.2d at 813. 
" Id. at 2217, 428 N.E.2d at 812. 
16 /d. 
" /d. at 2218, 428 N.E.2d at 813. 
" /d. Thus, the husband received neither alimony nor a division of property. In addition, 
the Court found that the trial court had erred in striking the master's finding that the wife was 
the sole owner of real estate held in joint title form. Id. The Court noted that the master had 
found that the presumption of joint ownership was rebutted by the other evidence, that this 
finding was not clearly erroneous, and was consistent with the antenuptial contract. /d. at 
2226, 2230,428 N.E.2d at 817, 819. 
The Court also rejected the husband's claim that the contract was invalid because entered in-
to under duress. /d. at 2226, 428 N.E.2d at 817. The Court noted that although the husband 
first saw the contract several hours before the wedding, he and his intended wife had discussed 
the agreement previously. /d. 
" /d. at 2223-24, 428 N.E.2d at 816. The Court left open the question of the validity of 
antenuptial contracts attempting to limit the duty of either spouse to support the other during 
the marriage. Id. at 2224, 428 N.E.2d at 816. Thus it is open to the Court to rule in a future 
case that waivers of alimony or support pendente lite in such contracts may not be enforced. 
Courts in two jurisdictions which are part of the trend holding that antenuptial contracts 
governing alimony and property rights upon divorce are not per se invalid have already done 
so. See Belcher v. Belcher, 271 So.2d 7, 10 (Fla. 1972) (waiver will be considered by the court 
but is not controlling) and Eule v. Eule, 24 Ill. App.3d 83, 88, 320 N.E.2d 506, 510 (1974) 
(clause in antenuptial contract forfeiting wife's right to temporary alimony if the marriage 
ended within seven years held void). See also Holliday v. Holliday, 358 So.2d 618, 620,620 n.6 
(La. 1978) (holding waiver of alimony pendente lite in an antenuptial contract void as against 
public policy, but leaving open the issue of the validity of waivers of permanent alimony). 
20 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2223, 428 N.E.2d at 815. 
21 /d. at 2223,428 N.E.2d at 815, citing G.L. c. 208, § 1 (1975). Recrimination is a defense to 
a divorce based on fault grounds. Recrimination bars the divorce of spouses guilty of equal 
marital fault. See, e.g., Reddington v. Reddington, 317 Mass. 760, 763, 59 N.E.2d 775, 777 
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defense to divorce and by recognizing irretrievable breakdown as a ground 
for divorce. 22 
In addition to establishing that antenuptial contracts governing rights 
upon divorce are not void per se, 23 the Court in dicta set forth guidelines for 
determining the extent to which these contracts should be enforced. 24 First, 
the Court noted that the validity of these.contracts would be judged by the 
fair disclosure rules delineated in Rosenberg v. Lipnick. 25 In Rosenberg, 
which involved the validity of antenuptial contracts governing rights upon 
death, 26 the Court established that the parties to these contracts would be 
viewed as occupying a confidential relationship. 27 Therefore, the Court im-
posed upon each party the burden of disclosing the amount, character and 
value of his or her assets. 21 The Rosenberg Court also stated that in deter-
mining the validity of an antenuptial contract, a court may consider the 
following factors: (1) whether the contract contains a fair and reasonable 
provision as measured at the date of its. execution for the party contesting 
the contract, 29 (2) whether the contract's execution was preceded by full 
disclosure or the party contesting the contract had, or should have had, in-
dependent knowledge of the other party's worth prior to executing the con-
tract, and (3) whether the contract contains a waiver by the party contesting 
the contract's validity. 30 
In addition to establishing that Rosenberg's fair disclosure rules would 
determine the validity of antenuptial contracts governing rights upon 
divorce, the Osborne Court set forth other guidelines for determining the 
extent to which these contracts should be enforced. 31 First, the Court 
(1945) (recrimination 'frivet[s] the legal bond"). 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2223, 428 N.E.2d at 815, citing G.L. c. 208, § 1 (1975). Divorces 
granted on the ground of irretrievable breakdown are often referred to as "no fault" divorces. 
2
' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2223-24, 428 N.E.2d at 816. 
24 Id. at 2224, 428 N.E.2d at 816. These rules did not apply to the contract at issue in 
Osborne because that contract was entered before the Supreme Judicial Court established that 
it would apply fair disclosure rules to antenuptial contracts. These rules apply only to antenup-
tial contracts entered after March 30, 1979; see id. and Rosenberg v. Lipnick, 377 Mass. 666, 
671, 389 N.E.2d 385, 388 (1979). 
25 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2224, 428 N.E.2d at 816, citing Rosenberg v. Lipnick, 377 Mass. 
666, 671-72, 389 N.E.2d 385, 388-89 (1979). For a discussion of Rosenberg, see Inker, Peroc-
chi, and Walsh, Domestic Relations, 1979 ANN. SURV. OF MASS. LAW§ 5.2, at 148-50. 
26 377 Mass. 666, 666, 389 N.E.2d 385, 386 (1979). 
27 /d. at 670-71, 389 N.E.2d at 388. 
21 Id. 
29 377 Mass. 666, 672, 389 N.E.2d 385, 388 (1979). The Rosenberg Court observed that the 
reasonableness of the contractual provision would be judged in the light of the parties' respec-
tive worth, ages, intelligence, literacy, business acumen, and prior family ties or commitments. 
Id. at 672, 389 N.E.2d at 389. 
•• Id. at 672, 389 N.E.2d at 388. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2224, 428 N.E.2d at 816. 
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observed that these contracts would be binding on the courts to the same ex-
tent as postnuptial separation agreements, since the same public policies ap-
plied to both kinds of agreements. 32 Thus, the Court established that these 
antenuptial contracts must be fair and reasonable at the time of the judg-
ment nisi. 33 In addition, the Court established that the courts could modify 
these antenuptial contracts in certain situations34 and provided two ex-
amples. The first example involved a spouse who would become a public 
charge if the contract were enforced as written. 35 The second concerned a 
custody provision that was not in a child's best interests. 36 The Court also 
observed that if support in excess of the amount provided in the contract 
were sought, the contract could be raised as a potential bar in the same pro-
ceeding. 37 Finally, the Court noted that contracts unreasonably encouraging 
divorce would be unenforceable on public policy grounds. 38 
The Supreme Judicial Court's decision in ·osborne to treat antenuptial 
contracts governing rights upon divorce as not per se void is significant 
because it may allow prospective spouses to contract out of the statutory 
system of equitable distribution which would otherwise govern their 
alimony and property rights upon divorce. 39 Several of the cases the 
Osborne Court cited as examples of decisions permitting these antenuptial 
contracts40 have explicitly recognized that given our society's high rate of 
divorce, these antenuptial contracts are important to those who want to 
32 /d. 
33 /d. 
" /d. In establishing this guideline as well as that requiring the contract to be fair at the time 
of the judgment nisi, the Court cited Knox v. Remick./d., citing Knox v. Remick, 371 Mass. 
433,358 N.E.2d 432 (1976). In Knox, the Court suggested that spousal support provisions con-
tained in postnuptial separation agreements could be accorded considerable finality. 371 Mass. 
433, 436-37, 358 N.E.2d at 435-36. Knox established that if "the agreement was not the prod-
uct of fraud or coercion, ... was fair and reasonable at the time of entry of the judgment nisi, 
and ... the parties clearly agreed on the finality of the agreement on the subject of interspousal 
support, the agreement concerning interspousal support should be specifically enforced, absent 
countervailing equities." /d. The Knox court provided two examples of countervailing 
equities, one a spouse who would otherwise become a public charge, the other a spouse who 
had not complied with some other provision of the agreement./d. at 437, 358 N.E.2d at 436. 
For a discussion of Knox, see Inker, Perocchi, and Walsh, Domestic Relations, 1977 ANN. 
SURV. OF MASS. LAW§ 1.1, at 4-7. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2224, 428 N.E.2d at 816. 
" /d. 
" /d. at 2224-25, 428 N.E.2d at 816. 
" /d. at 2225, 428 N.E.2d at 816. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 190 (1981) cited 
in Osborne contains one example of such a contract. Illustration 5 posits an antenuptial con-
tract providing that the husband will settle one million dollars on his prospective wife in the 
event of divorce. The RESTATEMENT notes that a court may decide that the large settlement 
unreasonably encourages divorce and refuse to enforce the contract on public policy grounds. 
39 For the text of this statute see note 11 supra. 
•• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2223, 428 N.E.2d at 815. 
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plan realistically for the possibility of divorce. 41 Nonetheless, the rules 
adopted by the Osborne Court, as well as those adopted by courts in other 
jurisdictions, render the enforcement of any antenuptial contract governing 
rights upon divorce uncertain. 42 
Uncertainty first arises because the validity of antenuptial contracts 
governing rights upon divorce will be judged by Rosenberg's fair disclosure 
rules. 43 Under these rules, an antenuptial contract should be valid if it con-
tains a fair and reasonable provision for the party contesting the contract, 
or if full disclosure of assets has preceded the contract's execution, or if the 
party contesting the contract had actual or constructive knowledge of the 
other party's worth prior to the contract's execution. 44 Yet courts have 
varied in their views of what facts, in the absence of disclosure, are suffi-
cient to charge the party contesting the contract with general knowledge of 
41 See, e.g., In reMarriage of Dawley, 17 Cal.3d 342, 352, 551 P.2d 323, 329, 131 Cal. Rptr. 
3, 9 (1976); Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App.3d 386, 392, 286 N.E.2d 42, 47 (1972). Cf. Unander v. 
Unander, 265 Or. 102, 108, 506 P.2d 719, 722 (1973) (recognizing the importance of these 
antenuptial contracts to those who enter them, but not mentioning the high rate of divorce). 
41 See Klarman, supra note 2, at 403. 
43 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2224, 428 N.E.2d at 816. 
44 For a fuller statement of the factors which may be considered in determining a contract's 
validity under Rosenberg, see supra text accompanying notes 28-30. The factors set forth in 
Rosenberg, with the exception of constructive knowledge and the presence of a waiver, state 
the majority rule for determining the validity of antenuptial contracts governing rights upon 
death. Lindey states the majority rule as follows: 
To render an ante-nuptial agreement valid, there must be a fair and reasonable provi-
sion for the wife, or - in the absence of such provision - there must be a full and frank 
disclosure to her of the husband's worth, or adequate knowledge thereof on her part in-
dependently of disclosure. 
LINDEY, supra note 1, at§ 90-52. 
At least two commentators have observed that the application of these rules in other jurisdic-
tions has created uncertainty concerning the enforceabilty of any antenuptial contract. See 
Gamble, The Antenuptial Contract, 26 U. MIAMI L. REv. 692, 729 (1972) [hereinafter referred 
to as Gamble]. Gamble, referring to antenuptial contracts governing rights upon death, states 
that "[t]he present guidelines ... are uncertain and unpredictable." Gamble, supra, at 729. 
See also Note, Antenuptial Contracts Determining Property Rights Upon Death or Divorce, 47 
U. M. KANsAS CITY L. REv. 31, 32 (1978); suggesting that although the courts state that they 
favor antenuptial contracts as promotive of marital stability, '' [i]n reality, the judicial attitude 
is at best confused and unpredictable, and at worst frankly hostile." 
The premise underlying these rules is that the parties to an antenuptial contract occupy a 
confidential relationship. See Gamble, supra, at 719-20. The validity of this premise has been 
questioned. Gamble, for example, criticizes the view that those entering antenuptial contracts 
occupy a confidential relationship, noting that courts have seen the relationship as one which 
"anesthetizes the senses of the female" and that this view does not realistically reflect current 
premarital relationships, particularly among those who use these contracts most, men and 
women past middle age. Gamble at 719-23. At least two cases in which the validity of an 
antenuptial contract governing rights upon death was at issue have acknowledged the validity 
of Gamble's criticisms. See Babb v. Babb, 604 S.W.2d 574, 577-78 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980); Pot-
ter v. Collin, 321 So.2d 128, 132 (Fla. App. 1975). 
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the other party's worth. 45 Courts also have varied in their views of what 
constitutes a fair and reasonable provision for the party contesting the con-
tract. 46 In addition, there is no settled view on whether an unfair provision 
will raise a presumption of nondisclosure or involuntariness and therefore 
shift the burden of proof on the issues of disclosure and voluntariness to the 
party seeking to enforce the contract. 47 One commentator has criticized the 
use of these fairness linked presumptions, noting that since contractual pro-
visions for the spouse are usually minimal, the presumptions are raised all 
too frequently. 48 
The greatest source of uncertainty concerning the enforceability of 
antenuptial contracts governing rights upon divorce is the Osborne Court's 
requirement that the contract be fair and reasonable at the time of enforce-
ment. 49 This requirement, which does not apply to antenuptial contracts 
governing rights upon death, in effect requires the parties to guess at both 
what a court will consider fair and at how circumstances may change be-
tween the contract's execution and its enforcement. so Admittedly, the 
Osborne Court's requirement that the contract be fair at the time of en-
forcement is concerned with protecting the party disadvantaged by the con-
tract from changed circumstances. Other concerns suggest, however, that 
the only requirement should be that the contract was entered knowingly and 
voluntarily. Primary among these concerns is the importance of the 
freedom of contract to the parties. In at least some instances, but for the 
antenuptial contract, there would be no marriage. 5 1 Thus, a limitation on 
., Compare Hosmer v. Hosmer, 611 S.W.2d 32, 35-37 (Mo. App. 1980) (recognizing that 
constructive knowledge of the other contracting party's worth will render the contract valid, 
but not discussing whether there was such knowledge where the parties lived together before 
the marriage) with In reMarriage of Cohn, 18 Wash. App. 502, 508, 569 P.2d 79, 83 (1977) 
(that parties lived together before marriage one factor indicating that the intended wife had 
constructive knowledge of her intended husband's means). 
" See, e.g., Burtoffv. Burtoff, 418 A.2d 1085, 1089 & n.3 (D.C. App. 1980) (if the marriage 
has been a short one, a fair provision is one allowing the spouse contesting the agreement to 
live as well after the marriage as before; if the marriage has been a longer one, the court may 
determine fairness in reference to the marital standard of living); Plant v. Plant, 320 So.2d 455, 
457 (Fla. App. 1975) (fairness determined in light of the husband's wealth and standard of liv-
ing at the time of the marriage). 
47 See, e.g., Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So.2d 1111, 1115-16 (Fla. App. 1976) (unfair provision 
raised a presumption of undue influence). But see In re Benker Estate, 97 Mich. App. 754, 755, 
296 N.W.2d 167, 168 (1980) (burden of proof is on party contesting the contract's validity). 
'' See Gamble, supra note 44, at 724-25. 
•• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2224, 428 N.E.2d at 816. 
" See Klarman, supra note 2, at 403 stating that the requirement that the contract be fair 
"handicaps individuals in their future planning because it is virtually impossible to predeter-
mine what a court may find to be a fair provision." 
" See, e.g., Barnhill v. Barnhill, 386 So.2d 749, 751 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980); Burtoff v. Bur-
toff, 418 A.2d 1085, 1087 (D.C. App. 1980). 
7
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the parties' contract rights may unduly interfere with their freedom to 
marry. An additional reason for not limiting the parties' freedom to con-
tract by requiring the contract to be fair at the time of enforcement is that 
many people apparently enter these contracts knowingly. One commentator 
has observed that the people who use these contracts have often been 
previously married and are usuaD~ past middle age. 52 A later assessment of 
fairness in these circumstances would only allow a court to substitute its 
own judgment for that of the spouse. In enforcing an antenuptial contract 
governing rights upon death, one court has observed that in these cir-
cumstances the reason for enforcing the contract is "that, essentially, the 
woman knows perfectly well what she is doing and does it voluntarily." 53 
Although the rules established in Osborne render the enforcement of 
antenuptial contracts governing alimony or property rights upon divorce 
somewhat uncertain, the Court's decision does establish that in some cir-
cumstances these contracts may be specifically enforced. A practitioner 
asked to draft one of these contracts should not represent both parties, since 
Massachusetts views prospective spouses as occupying a confidential rela-
tionship. 54 Moreover, the client should be advised that because of the confi-
dential relationship between prospective spouses, full disclosure of the 
amount, character, and value of each party's assets is required. The con-
tract's effect on the rights which each spouse would otherwise enjoy under 
state law should also be discussed with the client. In addition, a practitioner 
preparing one of these contracts should be aware that the fairness of the 
death and divorce provisions in an antenuptial contract will be judged as of 
different dates. If the. contract's validity is challenged in an estate context, 
the contract should be enforceable if it was fair at the date of its execution, 
or if its execution was preceded by full disclosure or general knowledge of 
the other spouse's worth. Yet, if the contract is questioned in a divorce pro-
ceeding, it will be valid only if there was full disclosure or general 
knowledge of worth, or if the contract was otherwise fair as of the date of 
its execution. In addition, the contract will not be enforceable unless it is 
fair as of the date of the decree nisi. The client should also be advised that 
even if the contract is enforced at the time of divorce, it may later be 
modified if its enforcement would render an ex-spouse a public charge." 
" See Gamble, supra note 44, at 730-33. Gamble's observation is based on his survey of all 
antenuptial contract cases cited in volume 16 of the Seventh Decennial Digest. The results of 
this survey are set forth in Gamble, supra note 44, at 730-32. 
" Rocker v. Rocker, 42 Ohio Op.2d 184, 193 (1967). 
•• Rosenberg v. Lipnick, 377 Mass. 666, 671, 389 N.E.2d 385, 388 (1979). 
For a discussion of the problems a practitioner should consider in drafting an antenuptial 
contract, see Cathey, Ante-Nuptial Agreements in Arkansas- A Drafter's Problem, 24 ARK. 
L. REv. 275 (1970). 
" See supra text accompanying notes 34-35. 
8
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1981 [1981], Art. 6
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1981/iss1/6
§ 3.2 DOMESTIC RELATIONS 65 
Finally, a client should be advised that, even in Massachusetts, the contract 
will not necessarily be enforced, and that since state laws vary greatly, a 
contract complying with Massachusetts law will not necessarily be en-
forceable in other states. 
§ 3.2. Child Custody-Incarcerated Parent-Need for Court Order.* 
Under Massachusetts law, a child's interests are presumed to be served best 
in his own family.' The state, however, under its parens patriae authority, 2 
may interfere in the familial relationship when the child's physical or emo-
tional well-being is endangered. 3 When the state acts in this capacity, the 
courts must carefully balance the state's primary concern with the welfare 
of the child against the rights of parents to raise their own children, 4 to be 
free from governmental intrusion into family life, 5 and to be afforded basic 
due process of law. 6 
In the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court, in Petition of the Depart-
ment of Public Welfare to Dispense with Consent to Adoption' (Petition), 
reaffirmed the long-held principle that the welfare of a child must be the 
primary concern of a court in a proceeding designed to terminate the 
custodial rights of a natural parent. 8 At the same time, the Court acted to 
protect more fully the basic rights of parents by requiring a court order 
before the state takes custody of the child of an incarcerated parent. 9 
In Petition, the Department of Public Welfare (D.P.W.) had submitted a 
petition pursuant to chapter 210, section 3.' 0 This statute permits the adop-
* By MariA. Wilson, staff member, ANNUALSURVEYOFMASSACHUSETISLAW. 
§ 3.2. ' Custody of a Minor (No.2), 378 Mass. 712, 718, 393 N.E.2d 379, 383; Custody of a 
Minor (No. 1), 377 Mass. 876, 882, 389 N.E.2d 68, 73 (1979); Richards v. Forrest, 278 Mass. 
547, 553, 180 N.E. 508, 511 (1932); G.L. c. 119, § 1. 
1 Parens patriae means "parent of the country.'' For an historical view of state intervention, 
see generally, Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's 
Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEo. L. J. 887, 894-917 (1975). 
' Petition of the Department of Public Welfare to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 1981 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1157, 1172, 421 N.E.2d 28, 36. 
• Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
' Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944), Custody of a Minor (No. 1), 377 Mass. 
876, 880-81, 389 N.E.2d 68, 72 (1979). 
• Santosky v. Kramer, SO U.S.L.W. 4332 (U.S. March 24, 1982); Lassiter v. Department of 
Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 37 (1981) (dissenting opinion); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 
2SS (1978). 
' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1157, 421 N.E.2d 28. 
' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1172, 421 N.E.2d at 36. See Richards v. Forrest, 278 Mass. 547, 
SS3, 180 N.E. 508, 511 (1932) ("the first and paramount duty of courts is to consult the welfare 
of the child."). 
' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1167, 421 N.E.2d at 33. 
10 G.L. c. 210, § 3 provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Whenever a petition for adoption is filed by a person having the care or custody of a 
9
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tion of a child over the objections of parents when a court has determined 
that it would be in the child's best interests to be freed for adoption. 11 The 
natural mother of the child argued that the petition should be dismissed 
because the Department originally had obtained custody of the child un-
constitutionally, 12 and subsequently had violated its own regulations.' 3 Fur-
thermore, the mother contended that the probate court, which had granted 
the petition, had not made an affirmative showing of her unfitness, 14 and 
that such a showing must be made by proof beyond a reasonable doubt or 
by clear and convincing evidence. 15 While disagreeing with the mother's 
contentions that the petition be dismissed and that a differ~nt evidentiary 
standard was required, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed and remanded 
the case because the probate court had failed to make an express finding of 
the mother's current unfitness.' 6 
The child in dispute, Shari, was born in 1975 while her unwed mother, 
Brenda, was incarcerated at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at 
Framingham (MCIF) for a drug-related offense.'' Although the mother had 
requested that her newborn infant be placed with an aunt, or if not, with a 
black foster family, the D.P.W., pursuant to chapter 119, section 23(C), 18 
/d. 
child, the consent of the . . . [parents] shall not be required if: ... (ii) the court hearing 
the petition finds that the allowance of the petition is in the best interests of the child, as 
defined in paragraph (c) .... (c) In determining whether the best interests of the child 
will be served by granting a petition for adoption without requiring certain consent as 
permitted under paragraph (a), the court shall consider the ability, capacity, fitness and 
readiness of the child's parents ... to assume parental responsibility ... and shall also 
consider the plan proposed by the department or other agency initiating the petition. If 
said child has been in the care of the department or a licensed child care agency for more 
than one year, in each case irrespective of incidental communications or visits from his 
parents ... there shall be a presumption that the best interests of the child will be served 
by granting a petition. 
II /d, 
" Petition of the Department of Public Welfare to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 
1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1160, 421 N.E.2d at 30. Specifically, the mother claimed that she was 
not afforded a hearing when the department frrst took custody following th~ child's birth, and 
that the later grant of custody to the department was made without giving' her proper notice, 
and therefore, an opportunity to be heard. Id. See notes 2S-34 and accomllanying text infra. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1169-70, 421 N.E.2d at 3S. The mother argued that the Depart-
ment had failed to place the child within the extended family, that the foster home chosen was 
not in ' geographically convenient location, that the Department had failed to encourage 
parental Visits and to send written reminders about visits, and that the Department had failed 
to send notice of the termination of visiting rights. /d. 
•• ld. at 11S9, 421 N.E.2d at 30. 
" Id. at 11S9-60, 421 N.E.2d at 30. 
" /d. at 1178-79, 421 N.E.2d at 39-40. 
" /d. at 1160, 421 N.E.2d at 30. Shari was born in December, 197S, and her mother was 
eligible for parole in March, 1976. /d. 
" G.L. c. 119, § 23A, as appearing in St. 1966, c. 473, provides in part: 
10
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placed Shari with a white foster family shortly after she was born. 19 For the 
next two years, the mother was in and out of detention. 20 During this 
period, there were times when the mother and child visited regularly and 
satisfactorily. 21 There were, however, occasions when Brenda failed to 
maintain contact with the Department for several months at a time. 22 As 
early as November, 1977, the caseworker assigned to Brenda had recom-
mended that the Department file guardianship proceedings for the child. 23 
Brenda, however, never was informed of these plans, but rather, was led to 
believe that she could be reunited with her child. 24 
I d. 
Any child born to an inmate of the Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Fram-
ingham,. . . shall be accepted by the department, .... Thereupon the department in 
consultation with the commissioner of correction or the chairman of the youth service 
board shall make such provision at said place of commitment or elsewhere for the care 
of said child as may seem to be for the best interests of said child. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1160,421 N.E.2d at 30. The family was chosen partly on the basis 
of their proximity to MCIF. ld. The probate judge had found that the D.P.W. had made at-
tempts to place Shari within her extended family, and in particular with Brenda's aunt, but had 
not done so because, according to the D.P. W ., no one could offer a realistic plan for the long-
term care of the child. Id. at 1160 n.2, 421 N.E.2d 30 n.2. The mother's aunt, however, had 
testified that she was never approached by the D.P.W. before Shari was placed, and that she 
had been prepared to care for the child during the mother's incarceration. ld. 
10 The mother was paroled in March to the National Center for Attitude Change (NCAC) in 
Boston, which she later left without authorization. ld. at 1160-61, 421 N.E.2d at 30. This 
departure from NCAC resulted in the termination of her parole and her return to MCIF. ld. at 
1161, 421 N.E.2d at 31. In February, 1977, Brenda was enrolled in a pre-release program at 
MCIF which involved outside work. She had an excellent work record in her job as a re-
ceptionist and clerk, but returned to MCIF full-time after an on-the-job drinking incident dur-
ing which Brenda had assaulted a correctional officer. ld. at 1162, 421 N.E.2d at 31. Brenda 
was paroled in Augutst, 1977, and then took to the streets for several months as she had neither 
a job nor money. ld. at 1163, 421 N.E.2d at 31. In May of 1978 Brenda was convicted of 
assault and battery with a dangerous weapon and was again returned to MCIF./d. at 1164,421 
N.E.2d at 32. 
" Id. at 1161, 421 N.E.2d at 30. Brenda had regular visits with Shari during her first in-
carceration at MCIF and saw her almost every week while she was at NCAC. Id. Between 
February and June, 1977, while Brenda was on her work-release program, Shari stayed with 
Brenda every other weekend from Friday through Sunday./d. at 1162,421 N.E.2d at 31. After 
Brenda had been released from MCIF in August of 1977, Brenda tried to arrange a weekend 
visit with Shari at a motel, but the D.P.W. case worker refused permission./d. Brenda had one 
last visit with Shari in January, 1978./d. at 1163-64,421 N.E.2d at 31-32. By June of that year, 
Brenda was back in MCIF, the D.P.W. had filed the petition to dispense with consent to adop-
tion, and Brenda was refused visitation rights. ld. at 1164, 421 N.E.2d at 32. 
" Id. at 1161-1164, 421 N.E.2d at 30-32. Brenda did not notify the D.P.W. of her 
whereabouts when she left NCAC, id. at 1161, 421 N.E.2d at 30-31, when she was released 
from MCIF in August 1977, id. at 1162, 421 N.E.2d at 31, and in March of 1978, when Brenda 
left the state to "avoid the law." Id. at 1164, 421 N.E.2d at 32. 
" Id. at 1162, 421 N.E.2d at 31. 
14 Id. at 1169, 421 N.E.2d at 34-35. 
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In March of 1978 a petition was filed by the D.P.W. for temporary iegat · 
custody of the child. 25 The petition was granted without the mother's 
knowledge, although the D.P.W. had tried to notify her by mail. 26 Two 
months later, the D.P.W. filed a petition pursuant to chapter 210, section 3, 
to dispense with Brenda's consent to Shari's adoption. 27 A hearing was held 
in probate court in April, 1980, and the judge granted the state's petition 
which freed the child for adoption by her foster parents. 21 The judge 
recognized that Brenda had benefitted from rehabilitative services, and 
probably would be considered a fit mother upon her release from prison. 29 
Nevertheless, the judge concluded that the best interests of the child would 
be served by granting the petition because the child might be devastated by 
removal from her pre-adoptive home. 30 The mother appealed the granting 
of the petition, and the appeal was transferred to the Supreme Judicial 
Court on its own motion. 31 
The Court first addressed the mother's contention that the petition 
should have been dismissed because the D.P.W. originally had taken 
custody over the child under chapter 11, section 23A without affording her 
an opportunity to be heard. 32 According to the D.P.W., this statute 
automatically transfers custody to the D.P.W. of all minor children born of 
incarcerated mothers. 33 The Court, noting that this interpretation of the 
statute created an irrebuttable presumption that an incarcerated mother is 
unfit, interpreted the statute as not requiring such an automatic loss of 
custody. 34 While the Court acknowledged the significant state interest in 
" Id. at 1164, 421 N.E.2d at 32. 
26 Id. The D.P.W. did not attempt to reach Brenda through her aunt, although Brenda 
claimed that the Department knew that she could have been reached in this manner. I d. at 
1169, 421 N.E.2d at 34. The probate judge had found that the proceeding under G.L. c. 119, § 
23(C), awarding temporary legal custody to the D.P.W., cured any original defects in the way 
the Department had gained custody over Shari. Id. at 1168, 421 N.E.2d at 34. The probate 
judge also concluded that Brenda's unavailability was her own fault because she was attempt-
ing to "avoid the law." /d. 
27 Id. It was not stated whether Brenda was able to obtain counsel or had been appointed 
cm~nsel when she was notified of the c. 210 petition pending against her. In 1979, the Supreme 
Judicial Court held that an indigent parent is entitled to counsel appointed at state expense 
when contesting a petition to dispense with parental consent to adoption. See Department of 
Public Welfare v. J.K.B., 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2202, 2206, 393 N.E.2d 406, 408. But see 
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981) (fourteenth amendment's 
due process clause does not require the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every 
parental status termination proceeding). 
21 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1159, 421 N.E.2d at 29. 
29 Id. at 1159 n.1, 421 N.E.2d at 29 n.l. 
•• Id. 
" /d. at 1158, 421 N.E.2d at 28. 
32 Id. at 1165, 421 N.E.2d at 32-33. 
" Id. See note 15 supra. 
,. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1166, 421 N.E.2d at 33. The Court noted that the Supreme Court 
12
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protecting children of incarcerated mothers, the Court stressed that impor-
tant family interests were involved. 35 Therefore, the Court reasoned that ab-
sent consent, the child could not be removed from the mother's custody 
without a court order. 36 Furthermore, the Court noted that chapter 119, 
section 1 requires the Department to use its efforts to preserve and 
strengthen the family, and therefore, family members should be the first 
ones sought to care for the child of an incarcerated mother. 37 Only after 
these efforts to preserve the family have been shown to be futile, the Court 
concluded, should the Department seek custody of the child. 31 
Despite the Court's finding that the Department had violated the 
mother's rights by taking custody of Shari without a court hearing, the 
Court refused to dismiss the petition. 39 The Court noted that under chapter 
210, section 3, the Department had standing to bring the petition when the 
child was in the "care" or "custody" of the Department. 40 Therefore, 
although there were defects in the custody proceedings, the Department had 
"care" of the child and could properly petition the Court to terminate 
parental rights. 41 The Court also was not persuaded by indications that the 
Department had not followed its own regulations in this case. 42 Finding that 
the Department had acted in good faith, the Court concluded that the 
Department's actions had not been "so arbitrary and irrational" as to re-
quire dismissal. 43 Furthermore, the Court noted that dismissal of the peti-
in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972) had struck down an irrebuttable presumption 
that the father of an illegitimate child was unfit as a parent. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1166, 421 
N.E.2d at 33. 
" /d. at 1166-67, 421 N.E.2d at 33. 
" Id. at 1167-68, 421 N.E.2d at 34. 
" /d. The Court noted that in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977) the 
Supreme Court had included the extended family as part of the constitutionally protected fami-
ly. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1165 n.7, 421 N.E.2d at 33 n.7. 
" /d. at 1167-68, 421 N.E.2d at 34. See also 110 C.M.R. § 5.05 (regulations of the Depart-
ment of Social Services which has succeeded the Department of Public Welfare in the provision 
of custodial care of children pursuant to St. 1978, c. 552). 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1170-71,421 N.E.2d at 35. See also Petition of the Department of 
Social Services to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2340, 2343-44,429 
N.E.2d 685, 687 (mother argued that because the D.S.S. had behaved improperly, the petition 
under G.L. c. 210, § 3 should be dismissed, using the exclusionary rule by way of analogy). See 
also Custody of a Minor, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 741, 747, 370 N.E.2d 712, 716 (1977) (mother 
argued that petition should be dismissed because present finding of unfitness was based on 
emotional problems which were caused by the D.P.W.'s illegally taking the child from her). 
•• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1169, 421 N.E.2d at 34-35. 
41 /d . 
., Id at 1169-70, 421 N.E.2d at 35. 
" /d. at 1170, 421 N .E.2d at 35 (citing Petition of the Dep't of Public Welfare to Dispense 
with Consent to Adoption, 376 Mass. 252, 26~, 381 N.E.2d 565, 575 (1978). See note 9 supra 
for the alleged violations. 
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tion because of departmental mistakes ultimately would not serve the best 
interests of the child. 44 
Having determined that the welfare of the child overrode any prior viola-
tions of the mother's rights by the Department, the Court next discussed the 
mother's current rights to the custody of her child. The Court noted that at 
common law parents are presumed to have a natural right to the care and 
custody of their children, and that children's interests are presumed to be 
best served if they are raised in their natural family. 45 Moreover, the Court 
observed that the interest of parents in their children is constitutionally pro-
tected as a fundamental interest. 46 Parental rights, however, are not ab-
solute, and the Court indicated that the state may intrude into the family to 
protect minor children from serious physical and emotional harm. 47 When 
the Commonwealth is compelled to so intrude, the Court opined, the 
welfare of the child is placed over every other public or private considera-
tion, including the rights of the parents. 48 Yet given the fundamental rights 
of parents, and the needs of the child, the Court reiterated its holding in re-
cent decisions that a showing of parental unfitness be made before a child is 
removed from his natural parents. 49 
In requiring an affirmative showing of "parental unfitness," the Court 
stressed that whether a parent meets this standard turns on how the family 
environment affects the welfare of the child: 50 parents are not to be 
measured simply by their conduct or character, s 1 but by their ability to fur-
•• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1170, 421 N.E.2d at 35. See generally Note, A Damages Remedy 
for Abuses by Child Protection Workers, 90 YALE L. J. 681, 701 (1981) (arguing that courts 
should not lose sight of the best interests of the child when confronted with abuses by child 
protection workers, and instead should award damages to parents). 
•• /d. at 1171, 421 N.E.2d at 36 . 
•• /d . 
• , ld. at 1172, 421 N.E.2d at 36. 
•• Id. 
•• /d. at 1173, 421 N.E.2d at 37 (citing Custody of a Minor (1), 377 Mass. 876, 882, 389 
N.E.2d 68, 73 (1979)). See also Custody of a Minor (2), 378 Mass. 712, 718, 393 N.E.2d 379, 
383 (1979); Bezio v. Patenaude, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2133, 2140, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1214-15. 
•• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1173-76,421 N.E.2d at 37-38. The statute, G.L. c. 210, § 3 allows 
a court to grant the petition to dispense with consent to adoption where the adoption would be 
in the best interests of the child. See note 7 supra. In Petition of New England Home for Little 
Wanderers, 367 Mass. 631, 328 N.E.2d 854 (1975), the Court first articulated the current inter-
pretation of this statutory language. In that case, the mother challenged the constitutionality of 
the statute, claiming that the state had to make a finding of parental unfitness before it could 
terminate her rights to the child./d. at 636, 328 N.E.2d at 858. The Court, contending that the 
mother misunderstood the relationship between the two standards, stated that the standards 
reflect "different degrees of emphasis on the same factors," and are "cognate and 
connected." /d. at 641, 328 N.E.2d at 860. 
" The Court noted that state intervention on behalf of a child was justifiable only where the 
child was endangered. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1176,421 N.E.2d at 38. Thus, the Court stated, 
intervention is not justifiable simply because parents are poor and unable to provide their 
14
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ther the best interests of the child. 52 In the words of the Court: "As parens 
patriae the State does not act to punish misbehaving parents; rather, it acts 
to protect endangered children." 53 Therefore, the Court stated, parents 
could be fit as parents for one child, while unfit as parents of another. 54 Ad-
ditionally, if the child had developed a strong attachment to other adults to 
the extent that it would be harmful to remove the child from their care, the 
natural parents could be considered to be unfit in. the sense that they would 
be unsuitable for the child.ss As a necessary predicate to depriving a natural 
parent of custody, the test of parental fitness and the test of best interests of 
the child, therefore, must be applied in conjunction with each other. 56 
While agreeing with the mother that the state must make an affirmative 
showing of parental unfitness, the Court rejected the adoption of a higher 
standard of proof for cases involving termination of parental rights. 5' The 
current standard of proof requires the judge to exercise "utmost care" in 
making custody decisions and that persuasive evidence be shown to remove 
a child from his parents. 58 The mother had urged that under the re-
quirements of due process, the state must prove the parents' unfitness by a 
showing of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or by clear and convincing 
evidence. 59 The Court observed, however, that the use of a higher standard 
of proof might jeopardize the welfare of the children involved, by placing 
too great a burden on the state. 60 According to the Court, the important 
parental interests at stake could be protected adequately by the present 
evidentiary standard since the judge must enter detailed findings which in-
dicate that the judge has given careful attention to the evidence. 61 The 
Court, therefore, reaffirmed its adherence to the preponderance of the 
evidence standard with heightened care for custody determinations. 
children with material advantages. /d. Similarly, parents may not, according to the Court, be 
deprived of custody of their children because of an unusual life style. /d. 
" Id. at 1174-76, 421 N.E.2d at 37-38. 
" Id. at 1176, 421 N.E.2d at 38. 
,. /d. at 1174, 421 N.E.2d at 37. 
"/d. 
" /d. at 1176, 421 N.E.2d at 38. 
" Id. at 117&-77, 421 N.E.2d at 38-39. See also Custody of a Minor (1), 377 Mass. 876, 884, 
389 N.E.2d 68, 74-75 (1979) (rejecting higher standard of proof); Custody of a Minor (2), 378 
Mass. 712, 720-22, 393 N.E.2d 379, 384-85 (1979) (rejecting higher standard of proof). The 
Court's rejection of a higher standard of proof has since been superceded by the Supreme 
Court, which has held that "clear and convincing" evidence is required by due process before a 
state may terminate parental rights. Santosky v. Kramer, 50 U.S.L.W. 4333,4339 (U.S. March 
24, 1982). 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1177, 421 N.E.2d at 39. 
" /d. at 1176,421 N.E.2d at 38. But see Santoskyv. Kramer, SOU.S.L.W. 4333,4339 (U.S. 
March 24, 1982). 
•• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1177, 421 N.E.2d at 39. 
61 /d. See Custody of a Minor (1), 377 Mass. 876, 886, 389 N.E.2d 68, 74-75 (1979). 
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According to the Petition Court, this heightened evidentiary standard 
was not met in this case. 62 The Court noted that the judge did not explicitly 
find that the mother currently was unfit to resume custody of her child. 63 
Although the judge had ultimately found that Shari would be harmed by a 
return to her mother, his specific findings were not made with the ex-
plicitness necessary for the reviewing court to determine whether these find-
ings were supported by the record. 64 It was also not clear to the reviewing 
court whether the judge had been influenced by inappropriate factors, such 
as the harm to the foster family if Shari were removed from them. 65 The 
Court, therefore, reversed and remanded the case for a new hearing, grant-
ing the parties the opportunity to present new evidence. 66 Furthermore, the 
Court ordered that the mother be granted visitation rights, denied by the 
D.P.W. since early 1978, subject to a showing of serious threat to the 
welfare of the child. 67 The Court also suggested that a preliminary hearing 
be held to determine if a program could be established which would 
ultimately reunite the mother with her child. 68 Thus, while not returning 
custody to the mother until her fitness could be properly adjudicated, the 
Court required that the Department make efforts, short of seriously harm-
ing the child, to reunite the family. 
The Court's ruling in Petition, that the Commonwealth, absent consent, 
could not take custody of the child of an incarcerated parent without a 
62 /d. at 1178, 421 N.E.2d at 39. 
" /d. The probate judge had found in part: 
[T]he court is of the opinion that Brenda has effectively reorganized her life and by any 
reasonable standards, ceteris paribus, could be deemed to be a fit mother upon her ex-
pected release from prison and marriage to her fiance. . . . She has had the benefit of 
just about every conceivable educational, vocational or rehabilitative program one 
could imagine. 
/d. at 1159 n.l, 421 N.E.2d 29 n.l. 
•• /d. 
" /d. at 1178, 421 N.E.2d at 39. 
" Id. at 1179, 421 N.E.2d at 40. 
67 /d. 
" /d. The Court thus demanded more than a mere presumption that returning the child to 
the mother would be harmful. The Court found unconvincing the findings of the probate 
court, based on psychiatric testimony, that the long-term effects on the child of removing her 
from her foster parents would be "devastating." /d. at 1178, 421 N.E.2d at 39. Further, the 
Court explicitly rejected a per se rule that would automatically give custody to prospective 
adoptive foster parents who had become psychological parents to the child in dispute. /d. at 
1175 n.16, 421 N.E.2d 38 n.16. But see Cennami v. Department of Public Welfare, 5 Mass. 
App. Ct. 403, 413, 363 N.E.2d 539, 546 (1977) ("the interest of the child in the continuation of 
a custody of sufficient duration to amount to a substitute parental relationship is recognized by 
our law to be a legally protected right."). See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families 
For Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 854-56 (1977) (denying due process rights of foster 
parents). 
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court order, 69 illustrates the Supreme Judicial Court's increasing concern 
with parental rights in custody and termination proceedings. In 1979 the 
Massachusetts Court first required that the judge exercise the utmost care in 
all custody cases,70 and that a finding be made of "current" parental un-
fitness. 71 In that same year, the Court rejected a probate judge's findings of 
unfitness as conclusory, for not specifying the shortcomings or handicaps 
of the parent that would endanger the child, and for not showing per-
suasively the necessity of permanently removing the child from the natural 
parent. 72 This concern with parental rights is consistent with statements in 
recent United States Supreme Court decisions indicating that where there is 
no showing of parental unfitness, it may be unconstitutional to break-up a 
natural family to serve the best interests of a child. 73 Additionally, in a peti-
tion brought to terminate parental rights under chapter 210, the 
Massachusetts Court ruled that indigent parents have a constitutional right 
to appointed counseJ.74 
The Petition Court's requirement of a court order before the state may 
take custody of a child without parental consent is an important safeguard 
for parents. Once parents have lost custody of their child, whether volun-
tarily or by court order, they have surrendered important rights75 and 
" See notes 32-38 and accompanying text supra. 
70 See notes 49-51 and accompanying text supra. 
" Custody of a Minor (1), 377 Mass. 876, 880, 389 N.E.2d 68, 72 (1979). In this case, 
although the Court rejected the need for a "clear and convincing evidence" standard of proof, 
the Court stated that it was "constitutionally" required that the judge use "utmost care" by 
making detailed and specific findings of fact. I d. at 877, 389 N .E.2d at 70. Further, the Court, 
citing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), indicated that the Commonwealth must 
affirmatively show parental unfitness as a predicate to depriving a parent of custody of a child. 
Custody of a Minor (1) at 882, 389 N.E.2d at 73. 
" Custody of a Minor (3), 378 Mass. 732, 393 N.E.2d 379, 385 (1979). Here, the Court 
stated that it was not enough for the trial judge to find that the mother was suffering from a 
mental disorder. Id., 393 N.E.2d at 385. Instead, the trial judge should have detailed the 
specific shortcomings or symptoms that would endanger the child if the child were to remain 
with the mother. /d. Further, the trial judge must show persuasively the necessity of per-
manently removing the child from the mother. Id. See also Petition of Worcester Children's 
Friend Society to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 791,796, 
402 N.E.2d 1116, 1119-20; Guardianship of a Minor, 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 674,418 
N.E.2d 343, 344. 
" See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978), Smith v. Organization of Foster 
Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring). See 
also Chemerinsky, Defining the "Best Interests": Constitutional Protections in Involuntary 
Adoptions, 18 J. FAM. L. 79, 89-113 (1979-80) (questioning the constitutionality of statutes 
which permit involuntary adoptions on a "best interest of the child" basis, without more 
specific guidelines limiting the discretion of the trial court). The author particularly criticizes 
the Massachusetts Case of Petition of New England Home for Little Wanderers, 367 Mass. 
631, 328 N.E.2d 854 (1975). Chemerinsky, 18 J. Fam. L. at 89-94. 
74 See note 22 supra. 
" See 110 C.M.R. § 5.02(5) which defines "Custody" as "the power to determine the 
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ultimately may lose all rights to the child. Under chapter 210, parental 
rights to children in the care or custody of the state may be terminated 
under the "best interests of the child" standard. 76 Current court interpreta-
tion of this statute, which terminates parental rights by freeing the child for 
adoption without parental consent, incorporates the "unfitness" standard 
into the "best interests of the child" standard. 77 Nonetheless, as stated by 
the Court in Petition, the standard allows a finding of unfitness where a 
''lengthy separation and a corresponding growth in ties between the child 
and the prospective adoptive parents indicate that the child would be hurt 
by being returned to the natural parents. " 78 Furthermore, once a child has 
been in custody for a year, a presumption is raised by statute that the best 
interests of the child will be served by allowing the child to be adopted 
without the parents' consent. 79 Thus, state assumption of custody of a 
child, for whatever reason, may diminish parental rights to the ultimate 
return of their child. 80 
child's place of abode, medical care and education; to control visits to the child; and to consent 
to enlistments, marriages and other contracts otherwise requiring parental consent." 
" See note 7 supra. In Petition of New England Home for Little Wanderers, 367 Mass. 631, 
636, 328 N.E.2d 854, 857-58 (1975) the mother argued unsuccessfully that the "best interests" 
standard should not apply where the child had voluntarily been placed with a private agency, as 
a "family obliged by temporary adversity such as illness to place its child in foster care might 
then be deprived of the child against its will if the agency decided that another family could bet-
ter raise the child." /d. The Court countered with the contention that the "best interests" 
standard took into account the fitness of the parent. /d. at 636-42, 328 N .E.2d at 858. See note 
40 and accompanying text supra. A dissent in Little Wanderers by Chief Justice Hennessey 
contended that the two standards were in fact different, and placed different burdens on the 
parents. /d. at 648-49, 328 N.E.2d at 864. Under the "best interests" test, the dissent observed, 
the rights of the parents were subordinated to those of the child, while under the "unfitness" 
test, the focus is more on the character and conduct of the parent. /d. See also Chemerinsky, 
Defining the "Best Interests": Constitutional Protections in Involuntary Adoptions, 18 J. 
FAM. L. 79, 89-93 (1979-80) (criticizing the result in Little Wanderers). 
" See notes 40-44 and accompanying text supra. 
71 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1175, 421 N.E.2d at 38 (citing Petition of the New England Home 
for Little Wanderers to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 367 Mass. 631, 639, 642, 328 
N.E.2d 854, 859, 861 (1975)). 
" See note 7 supra. See also 110 C.M.R. § 5.11(9). 
•• See Petition of New England Home for Little Wanderers, 367 Mass. 631,650,328 N.E.2d 
854, 865 (1975) (Hennessey, J., dissenting): 
/d. 
It occurs to me that this parent would most likely not have "lost" her child had she not 
temporarily placed the child in the New England Home while she attempted to settle her 
life; an act which in her judgment was best for the child. Yet that is the result reached by 
the decision rendered in this case. To extend the best interests standard to these facts 
would in my opinion go fUrther than the Legislature intended. As this case indicates, the 
best interests standard may bring to the fore considerations different in kind and degree 
from unfitness, considerations perhaps decisive as to whether the parent will lose his or 
her right to protest the taking away of a child through an involuntary adoption. 
18
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1981 [1981], Art. 6
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1981/iss1/6
§ 3.2 DOMESTIC RELATIONS 75 
Parental safeguards in the initial custody decision are also important 
because of the state's discretionary authority to structure the contacts 
parents have with a child in custody. Although the state is under an affirm-
ative duty to encourage visits, 81 visitation rights may be denied if the child's 
physical or emotional well-being would be endangered by the visits. 82 Once 
the child is in custody, regardless of whether a finding of parental unfitness 
even has been made, a petition may be filed to dispense with the parents' 
consent to adoption. 83 After the petition has been filed, visitation rights are 
no longer of right, and may cease. 84 In Petition, for example, although the 
petition to dispense with consent to adoption was filed in May, 1978, by the 
D.P.W., a judgment on the petition was not rendered until April, 1980.85 
During the two year interval between the filing and judgment, the mother 
had no visitation rights with the child. 86 The probate judge had found that 
at the time of the hearing in 1980, Brenda had reorganized her life and was 
then a fit mother. 87 The judge held, however, that the child should be 
adopted by the family she had been placed with shortly after the petition 
had been filed, because it would be "cruel and dangerous" to upset her life 
again, and because, by that time, her natural mother was a "stranger" to 
her. 88 Between the time the petition was granted and the time the Supreme 
Judicial Court reversed the judgment, another year had passed during 
which the mother did not see her child. 89 Custody of the child, therefore, 
may inadvertently lead to a situation, as in Petition, where the parent is 
threatened with loss of a child due in part to the state's own actions in 
restricting visitation rights. 90 By requiring a court order before custody is 
given to the state without parental consent, the Petition Court has lessened 
the likelihood of such situations arising needlessly in the future. 
"110 C.M.R. § 5.15. 
" /d. 
" G.L. c. 210, § 3. See also Petition of New England Home for Little Wanderers, 367 Mass. 
631,642, 328 N.E.2d 854, 861 (1975) (nothing in§ 3 to indicate that custody means "anything 
other than physical custody, whatever the original basis for it."). 
14 110 C.M.R. § 5.15 states: 
/d. 
The right to weekly visits shall not apply in any case in which the department or pro-
vider has filed a petition to dispense with the need for parental consent to adoption pur-
suant to G.L. c. 210, section 3. In such a case, the department or provider shall petition 
the probate court to make an appropriate order regarding visits. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1159, 1164, 421 N.E.2d at 29, 32. 
16 /d. 
" See note 53 supra . 
.. /d. 
" See notes SS-57 and accompaying text supra. 
•• See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, S Mass. App. Ct. 741, 745, 370 N.E.2d 712, 715 (1977) 
(mother claimed that child's long absence from mother, caused by actions of D.P.W., was 
principal affirmative reason relied on by judge in removing custody from parent). See generally 
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The Court in Petition strengthened the fundamental rights of parents in 
the family relationship by requiring a court order when the state seeks 
custody of a child against the wishes of its parents. The Court, however, 
refused to give parents the added protection of a "clear and convincing 
evidence" standard of proof in proceedings to dispense with parental con-
sent to adoption." Shortly after the Survey year, the United States Supreme 
Court, in Santosky v. Kramer, 92 ruled that states are constitutionally re-
quired to use a standard of proof equal to or higher than "clear and con-
vincing evidence" in hearings to terminate parental rights. 93 The Supreme 
Court in Santosky thus recognized the vital parental interests involved and 
the critical need for procedural protections where the permanent separation 
of parent and child is at sta:ke. 94 In light of this decision, parents may now 
be able to challenge successfully the Massachusetts evidentiary standard" 
and receive added protection when the state seeks to terminate their rights 
to their children. 
§ 3.3. Chlld Custody-Parental Unfitness-Minor's Wishes Relevant.* 
In a companion case to Petition of the Department of Public Welfare to 
Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court addressed 
the parental unfitness standard in the context of a care and protection pro-
ceeding under chapter 119.2 The Court held, in Custody of a Minor, 3 that a 
Note, A Damages Remedy for Abuses by Child Protection Workers, 90 YALE L. J. 681 (1981). 
" See notes 45-51 and accompanying text supra. 
92 50 U.S.L.W. 4332 (U.S. March 24, 1982). 
" /d. at 4339. 
" ld. at 4335. 
" See notes 45-51 and accompanying text supra. 
* By Marl A. Wilson, staff member, ANNuAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 3.3. ' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1157, 421 N.E.2d 28. See Domestic Relations, 1981 ANN. SuRv. 
MASs. LAw§ 3.2. 
2 G.L. c. 119, §§ 24 and 26. Section 24 provides in part: 
The ... court . . . upon the petition of any person alleging on behalf of a child under 
the age of eighteen years ... that said child is without: (a) necessary and proper physical 
or educational care and discipline, or; (b) is growing up under conditions or cir-
cumstances damaging to a child's sound character development or; (c) who lacks proper 
attention of parent . . . or; (d) whose parents . . . are unwilling, incompetent or 
unavailable to provide any such care, discipline or attention, may issue a precept to 
bring such child before said court, shall issue a notice to the department, and shall issue 
summonses to both parents of the child to show cause why the child should not be com-
mitted to the custody of the department or other appropriate order made. 
Section 26 provides in part: 
If the court finds the allegations in the petition proved within the meaning of this 
chapter, it may adjudge: that said child is in need of care and protection and may com-
mit the child to the custody of the department until he becomes eighteen years of age or 
until in the opinion of the department the object of his commitment has been ac-
complished whichever occurs first; or make any other appropriate order with reference 
to the care and custody of the child as may conduce to his best interests, . . . . 
' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1180, 421 N.E.2d 63. 
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parent could be found unfit, and the child placed in the custody of the state, 
if the parent was unable to further the child's welfare. • Furthermore, the 
Court ruled that the wishes of the fifteen-year-old child in dispute were 
properly accorded great weight by the trial judge.' 
In Custody of a Minor, a mother appealed the award of permanent 
custody' of her son Dom to the Department of Public Welfare (D.P.W.).' 
Dom, the fourth child in a family of seven children, had been born in 
Thailand in 1964.• Since his father had died shortly before his birth, Dom 
went to live with an uncle for a year and a half.' In 1973 the family moved 
to America after the mother's marriage to an American serviceman. 10 Dom 
and a brother remained with relatives in Thailand for another year before 
joining their family in Arnerica. 11 In 1975, the marriage broke up, and the 
mother, then pregnant with her seventh child, became the family's sole 
source of support. 12 In that same year, Doin's fifth grade teacher, Mrs. 
DeWitt, became concerned about Dom's school behavior and his chronic 
absenteeism. 13 Dom complained to his teacher about his home life and the 
local board of health was called upon to investigate. 14 Although the 
caseworker found that the family was experiencing some difficulties, and 
recommended that Dom undergo a psychological evaluation, she deemed 
the home adequate, and found no need to remove Dom from the home. 15 
Difficulties, however, continued between Dom and his mother. 16 Shortly 
before the new baby was born, Dom, with the consent of his mother, went 
• /d. 1186-87, 421 N.E.2d at 66-67. 
' Id. at 1187-88, 421 N.E.2d at 67. 
• Although called permanent custody, the parents have the right to seek a review and 
redetermination every six months until the child is eighteen. G.L. c. 119, § 26. 
7 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1181, 421 N.E.2d at 63-64. 
• Id. at 1181, 421 N.E.2d at 64 . 
• /d. 
10 /d. 
II Id. 
12 /d. 
" Id. at 1182, 421 N.E.2d at 64. The absenteeism was due in part to the mother's effort to 
discipline Dom for not doing chores by keeping Dom home from school. /d. 
•• Id. Dom told his teacher that he was unfairly made to do household chores, was hit by his 
mother, and sometimes denied food. /d. 
" /d. at 1182-83, 421 N.E.2d at 64-65. The caseworker met with the family several times, 
and found that the mother was anxious to be a good mother to her children. Although she ad-
mitted to using mild corporal punishment, no instances of physical abuse were substantiated. 
Id. at 1182, 421 N.E.2d at 64. Dom was at that time defying. his mother by refusing to do 
household chores, not coming home in the evening when he was supposed to, and talking back 
to his mother. /d. The caseworker also found that there were fmancial problems, and too little 
space in the home. Id. 
" /d. at 1183,421 N.E.2d at 6S. Dom was-misbehaving at home, had threatened his family, 
and the atmosphere at home was very tense. Id. 
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to live temporarily with the family of his teacher, the De Witts. 17 Once there, 
he refused to return home. 11 A care and protection petition was then filed, 
and Dom was placed temporarily with the DeWitts. 19 Between 1976 and 
1979, efforts were made to reunite Dom with his family through regular 
visits, but Dom remained adamant in his refusal to return to his mother. 20 
Because of Dom's strong feeling of hostility towards his natural mother and 
his attachment to the DeWitts, in 1979 a district court judge found Domin 
need of care and protection and placed him in the permanent custody of the 
D.P. W. 21 After a trial de novo, the custody judgment was affirmed, and the 
mother appealed. 22 The Supreme Judicial Court granted direct review. 23 
In appealing the care and protection order,the mother's main contention 
was that the trial judge had failed to fmd her unfit. 24 Under both the federal 
constitution and Massachusetts law, th-e mother argued, a finding of pa-
rental unfitness is necessary before the state may take custody of a child. 25 
Referring to its decision that same day in Petition of the Department of 
Public Welfare to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 26 the Court held that 
the trial judge's failure to make an express finding of "general parental un-
fitness" did not warrant a reversal. 27 Under the standard for unfitness 
enunciated in Petition, the Court stated that "(a] finding of parental un-
fitness may be predicated on the circumstances within a particular family, 
as they adversely affect the particular child, without regard to the general 
quality of parental conduct per se." 21 This standard, the Court concluded, 
had been met in this case. 2' The Court noted that although the trial judge 
did not expressly find that petitioner was an unfit parent, his conclusion, 
supported by the findings of fact and the trial record, amounted to a finding 
of unfitness. 30 The evidence showed a deep and longstanding rift between 
the mother and the son. 31 The evidence also showed that the mother had re-
fused counseling as a remedy for the situation. 32 Although the case worker 
11 Id. 
11 Id. 
" Id. Pursuant to G.L. c. 119, § 24, Dom was placed in the care of the Department of Public 
Welfare, and was placed with the DeWitts, as he refused to return home. Id. 
•• Id. at 1184, 421 N.E.2d at 65. 
" Id. at 1185, 421 N.E.2d at 66. 
zz Id. 
" Id. at 1181, 421 N.E.2d at 64. 
•• Id. 
"Id. 
•• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1157, 1171, 421 N.E.2d at 28, 36. 8ef supra note 1. 
17 Custody of a Minor, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1186-87, 421 N.E.2d at 66-67. 
•• Id. at 1185, 421 N.E.2d at 66. 
•• ld. at 1186-87, 421 N.E.2d at 66-67 • 
•• /d. 
II /d. at 1186, 421 N.E.2d at 66. 
•• Id. The mother evidently refused counselina "because of the 'mean' things Dom said to 
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who had investigated the home had found it "adequate and clean" and the 
other children to be "supportive of their mother," 33 a psychologist had 
testified that Dom felt that his mother did not love or care for him. 34 To 
return Dom to his family, according to the psychologist might " 'result in 
Dom's running away, or the carrying out ofthreats against his mother.' " 35 
Moreover, the trial judge had found that Dom had developed strong ties to 
the De Witts and needed to have his future with them secured. 36 Thus, 
although the trial judge had not found the mother unfit per se, he had 
found that she was unable to further Dom's welfare. 37 
In addition to contesting the failure of the trial judge to find unfitness, 
the mother argued that the judge impermissibly had allowed the child's own 
wishes to determine the outcome of the custody dispute. 38 The Court noted 
that at the time of the trial court hearing, Dom was fifteen years old. 39 Fur-
ther, his desire to stay with the DeWitts resulted from deep and perhaps ir-
remedial differences between himself and his mother. 40 The Court observed 
that Massachusetts law had long given recognition to the preference of 
mature minors. 41 Thus, the trial judge had been correct in according "great 
weight" to the wishes of this child in this case. 42 
In acceding to the wishes of the child in Custody of a Minor, the Court 
realistically dealt with a situation which it could do little to alter. The child 
in question was approaching his eighteenth birthday at the time of the ap-
peal, and the Court acknowledged that it had doubts whether a return of 
custody to the mother could be enforced. 43 In fact, since 1976, when the 
mother first allowed her son to live with the De Witts for the month until her 
baby was born, her son steadfastly had refused to return home, threatening 
to run away if forced to do so. 44 Under these circumstances the Court al-
lowed the child's preference to be a determining factor. 
her in front of others." /d. at 1184, 421 N.E.2d at 65. 
" Id. at 1183-84, 421 N.E.2d at 65. 
34 /d. at 1184-85, 421 N.E.2d at 65. 
" /d. at 1184-85, 421 N.E.2d at 65-66. 
36 /d. at 1186-87, 421 N.E.2d at 66-67. 
31 Id. 
" Id. at 1181, 421 N.E.2d at 64. 
" /d. at 1187, 421 N.E.2d at 67. 
40 /d. 
41 /d. citing Baird v. Attorney Gen., 371 Mass. 741, 753, 360 N.E.2d 288, 296 (1977) con-
sidered sub nom. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (discussing ability of mature minor to 
make abortion decision). The Court also cited Curtis v. Curtis, 5 Gray 535 (1855) and Com-
monwealth v. Hammond, 10 Pick. 274 (1830). 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1187,421 N.E.2d at 67. 
Both Curtis and Hammond dealt with children who had been placed voluntarily by their 
mothers with the Society of Shakers until of legal age, Curtis by oral contract, Hammond by 
indenture. S Gray S3S and 10 Pick. 274. 
42 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1187, 421 N.E.2d at 67. 
43 /d. at 1187-88, 421 N.E.2d at 67. 
44 /d. at 1183, 1184, 1185, 421 N.E.2d at 65, 66. 
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The Court limited its holding on the propriety .of considering a child's 
wishes in care and protection proceedings to the circumstances of the case. 45 
In addition, the Court indicated that a court should substitute its own judg-
ment for that of a younger, less mature child. 46 Nonetheless, the case has 
established a precedent and courts will undoubtedly be called upon in the 
future to determine when, and to what extent, a minor's wishes will be con-
sidered. 
In making these determinations, some guidance may be gleaned from 
both the law and literature on custody disputes in divorce actions, where the 
wishes of the child are frequently a factor. 47 The Massachusetts statute 
governing the award of custody in divorce proceedings48 provides that, ab-
sent misconduct, the rights of parents are equal, and custody is to be deter-
mined on the basis of the "happiness and the welfare of the children. " 49 
Courts may, in determining the ''happiness and welfare of the child,'' con-
sider the preferences of the child. 50 Indeed, approximately eighteen states 
now have statutory provisions for considering the preferences of children in 
divorce custody disputes." Furthermore, experts recognize that it may be 
difficult or impossible to enforce custodial orders resulting from a divorce, 
which do not fit the wishes of older children. 52 Nonetheless, experts 
acknowledge that children may suffer from feelings of guilt when their 
stated preferences determine the outcome of custodial disputes. 53 
Divorce custodial disputes, however, involve two parents with equal 
rights to the child. 54 Where the contest for custody is between parents and 
•• /d. at 1187, 421 N.E.2d at 67. 
•• /d. See also Hale v. Hale, 1981 Mass. App. Adv. Sh. 2117, 2125, 429 N.E.2d 340, 345. 
The court here indicated, in a divorce custody dispute, that the preferences of children aged 
nine and thirteen should be treated with caution. /d . 
• , See generally Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 13% (1965 and Supp.). 
•• G.L. c. 208, § 31. 
•• Id. 
•• See, e.g., Grandell v. Short, 317 Mass. 605, 59 N.E.2d 274 (1945). 
" Freed and Foster, Jr., Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview, 14 FAM. L. Q. 229, 262 
(1981). 
52 COMMITTEE ON THE FAMILY GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY- DIVORCE, 
CHILD CuSTODY AND THE FAMILY, 822-23 (1980). 
" /d. at 890-891. See, also, "Proposed Child Custody Statute Submitted by the Subcommit-
tee on Custody of the Massachusetts Bar Association and the Massachusetts Psychiatric Socie-
ty, April 1980," reprinted in CHILD CUSTODY- AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO THE 
REDEFINED FAMILY (MCLE-NELI, INC., 1981), 46, stating: 
/d. 
Older children may manipulate or punish a parent by saying that he or she prefers to live 
with the other parent. Children should not believe that they carry the responsibility for 
deciding who gets custody, because this is too great a burden and engenders anxiety and 
guilt later on. Yet, the child's wishes and reasons should be heard and considered. 
•• G.L. c. 208, § 31. 
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unrelated third parties, courts have traditionally hesitated to abridge the 
rights of natural parents, despite the wishes of the child, except in cases 
where the parents have abandoned the child. 55 Although there is an even 
greater need for judicial care when it is the state which is seeking to take 
custody from parents, there is support for allowing a mature minor to have 
an active voice in the custody decision. ' 6 Courts nonetheless should proceed 
with caution in developing standards for determining the extent to which a 
child's wishes should be a factor when the state intervenes in the familial 
relationship. 
§ 3.4. Cblld Custody-Effect of Cohabitation by One Parent.* In 
custody disputes, the courts consider many factors in determining which 
parental environment is best for the child.' One relevant consideration in 
determining custody is the parents' compliance with the laws, and in par-
ticular, the legality of the parents' living arrangements. 2 This issue is par-
ticularly likely to arise in cases involving parental cohabitation with an un-
married person. 
In Fort v. Fort, 3 the Massachusetts Appeals Court established that it was 
not improper to award custody of a minor child to a parent who cohabits 
with a person other than his or her spouse. • In so ruling, the court discussed 
the significance which should be ascribed to the allegation that a parent is 
unfit because he or she cohabits illegally with another.' The court stated 
that the moral or criminal nature of illegal cohabitation is only relevant 
" Both Commonwealth v. Hammond, 10 Pick. 274 (1830) and Curtis v. Curtis, 5 Gray 535 
(1855), cited by the Court in Custody of a Minor were cases where the natural mothers had 
voluntarily given their children over to religious societies for their long-term upbringing. See 
supra note 40. For a more modem case, rejecting the preference of a child in favor of the 
natural parent, see Duclos v. Edwards, 344 Mass. 544, 183 N.E.2d 708 (1962). For an overview 
of how other jurisdictions have dealt with this question, see generally Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 
1396, 1443-49 (1965 & Supp.). 
,. See, e.g., Institute of Judicial Administration and American Bar Association, Joint Com-
mission on Juvenile Justice Standards, STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT (tent. ed. 
1977) standard 8.4, p. 161; Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of 'Neglected' Children: Stand-
ards for Removal of Children from their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster 
Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 623, 696-697 (1976). 
California requires a court to consider the wishes of a child of sufficient age and reason in 
making custody awards. In re B.G., 11 Cal.3d 679, 696, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444,455, 523 P.2d 244 
(1974). Other courts have been less willing to be swayed by a child's preference. See, e.g., 
Harper v. Department of Human Resources, 159 Ga. App. 758, 285 S.E.2d 220 (1981). 
* Kevin J. Lake, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 3.4. ' See infra text at note 48. 
' See infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text. 
' 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1594,425 N.E.2d 754, review denied, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
2140. 
• Id. at 1601-02, 425 N.E.2d at 758-59. 
'Id. . 
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where evidence is presented which demonstrates an adverse effect on the 
child directly attributable to that cohabitation. 6 
The Court of Appeals ruled that the findings of fact, which were found 
by a master and adopted by the trial judge, 7 were supported by the 
evidence. 8 These facts revealed that the parties in Fort were married in 
1959.9 During the course of their marriage, the couple had three children: a 
daughter and two sons who were born in 1961, 1963 and 1973 respectively. 10 
Since the daughter and elder son preferred to live with their father, the 
mother challenged only the trial judge's decision to award custody of the 
younger son, then eight years old, to the father. 11 
The master also found that the father's career required him to work long 
hours and often caused him to remain away from home for extended 
periods oftime. 12 Consequently, prior to the divorce, the mother exclusively 
assumed all domestic duties, including child rearing. 13 According to the 
master's report, the mother disciplined the children by inappropriate words 
and acts of corporal punishment sufficient to cause humiliation and emo-
tional estrangement of the children. 14 In addition, the wife's inconsistent 
behavior led to mental and emotional disturbances which polarized the 
family members. 1 ' Accordingly, the relationship between the mother and 
the older two children was strained. 16 In contrast to the mother, the master 
found that the husband's consistent temperament satisfied the emotional 
needs of the children. 17 
The couple's separation ultimately was caused by the husband's relation-
ship with a woman who had been an employee at his place of business. 11 
The master found that the father had sexual relations with the woman just 
prior to his separation from the mother. After leaving the marital home, the 
father moved into the woman's apartment where he envisioned a life 
together for himself, the other woman, and the children. 19 Most important-
ly, the master found that no testimony indicated that the father's cohabita-
tion with the woman adversely affected any of the children. 20 
• /d. 
' /d. at 1595, 425 N.E.2d at 755-56. 
' /d. at 1596, 425 N.E.2d at 756. 
' ld. at 1595, 425 N.E.2d at 755-56. 
10 /d. 
11 /d. 
12 /d. 
u /d. 
u /d. 
15 /d. at 1575-96, 425 N.E.2d at 755-56. 
II Id. 
17 /d. at 1596, 425 N.E.2d at 756. 
II /d. 
It Jd, 
•• /d. 
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On cross-complaints of the husband and wife for divorce, judgments 
were entered which dissolved the marriage, provided for alimony and 
equitable distribution of assets, and awarded custody of the two younger 
children, who were still minors, to the husband. 21 The wife appealed, con-
tending that the judge's decision to award custody of the youngest son to 
the father was erroneous. She maintained that the father was not suited to 
care for this child because he was cohabiting with an unmarried woman. 22 
On appeal, the wife relied primarily upon an Illinois case, Jarrett v. Jar-
rett. 23 In Jarrett, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the exemplary effect 
on the children of the mother's continuing cohabitation with an unmarried 
man, in violation of Illinois statutes, justified a modification of the custody 
award of the three minor children. 24 The Fort court noted that the conduct 
of the custodial parents in Jarrett and Fort were similar because cohabita-
tion violated state statutes in each case. B The conduct complained of in 
Fort apparently violated Massachusetts state statutes prohibiting lewd and 
lascivious cohabitation, 26 adultery, 27 and fornication. 21 
The Massachusetts Appeals Court acknowledged that courts may con-
sider the "moral fitness or character" of a proposed custodian as a factor 
bearing on the best interests and well-being of the child. 29 The court cau-
tioned, however, that any determination of custodial arrangements should 
not be made in a highly technical or overly legalistic manner. 30 All custody 
arrangements naturally have imperfections and deficiencies which can af-
fect the well-being of the child. The judgment, therefore, must balance the 
significance of those imperfections with their effect on the child's well-being 
and development. 31 In addition, the Appeals Court noted that judges, serY-
ing society comprised of widely disparate cultural, moral, and religious 
" Id. at 1594-95, 425 N.E.2d at 754. At the time of the litigaton, the oldest daughter at-
tended college and considered her father's home as her own when college was not in session. 
/d. at 1595, 425 N.E.2d at 754. The oldest son attended a private boarding school, and by 
preference and agreement of the parties, lived with his father when school was not in session. 
/d. The controversy, therefore, centered solely around the custody of the youngest child. /d. at 
1595, 425 N.E.2d at 754. 
" /d. at 1596, 425 N.E.2d at 756. 
" /d. See Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 Ill.2d 337, 400 N.E.2d 421 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 927 
(1980). 
" 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1597, 425 N.E.2d at 756; Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 Ill.2d at 
345, 400 N.E.2d at 423 (1979). 
" 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1597, 425 N.E.2d at 756. 
,. G.L. c. 272, § 16. 
27 /d. § 14. 
21 /d. § 18. 
29 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1598, 425 N.E.2d at 757. 
•• /d. at 1601, 425 N.E.2d at 758-59. 
" /d. at 1601-02, 425 N.E.2d at 758-59. 
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backgrounds, cannot impose their own personal moral and religious view-
points as the proper standard. 32 Moral judgments concerning the comport-
ment of the proposed custodial parents are appropriate only where ''the 
parent's lifestyle has a direct and articulable adverse impact on the child ... 
[or] ... the . . . [custodial parent's] behavior is related to parenting 
ability. " 33 
The court thereafter considered the effect which should be assigned to a 
parent's violation of certain Massachusetts statutes in determining a 
custodial arrangement which best serves the interests of the child. 34 Even if 
the father's moral conduct did not affect the children adversely, the court 
could have found, as did the court in Jarrett, that the father was an unfit 
parent because his activity violated state statutes. 35 Yet the court took a dif-
ferent approach than the Illinois Supreme Court. The court noted that 
despite widespread official knowledge of the statutes prohibiting, ''lewd and 
lascivious" cohabitation, fornication, and adultery, individuals rarely have 
been prosecuted for violating them. 36 The court maintained that this lack of 
enforcement does not necessarily invalidate such statutes or make them 
judicially unenforceable. 37 In custodial determinations, however, the court 
reasoned that the significance of such violations should be evaluated in 
terms of the interpersonal relationships of the persons involved as they af-
fect the well-being of the child whose custody is in question. 38 As a practical 
matter, therefore, the court concluded that it is immaterial that the 
custodial parent's behavior violates criminal statutes which are wholly ig-
nored by law enforcement officials in the absence of evidence 
demonstrating that such conduct adversely affects the well-being of the 
child. 39 This judicial principle appears to be consistent with the general rule 
that in order for a violation of a criminal statute to be relevant in a civil 
hearing there must be a causal relationship between the activity the statute 
seeks to prevent and the harm alleged. 
In sum, the court did not consider the moral or criminal character of the 
husband's cohabitation relevant in the absence of evidence demonstrating 
an adverse effect on the children. 40 The court instead contrasted the hus-
band's steady disposition and the peacefulness of his living arrangement, 
" Id. at 1598, 425 N,E.2d at 757. 
" Id. 
•• Id. at 1601, 425 N.E.2d at 758-59. 
" The Appeals Court, in reaching its decision, assumed the validity of the statutes which 
had been violated since neither party had argued that they were invalid. Id. 
" Id. at 1599, 425 N.E.2d at 758. 
" Id. at 1601, 425 N.E.2d at 758-59. See also District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson 
Co., 346 U.S. 100, 113-14 (1953); 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction§ 34.06 (4th ed. 1973). 
" 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1602, 425 N.E.2d at 759. 
" Id. 
•• Id. 
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with the emotionally charged atmosphere generated by the wife's interac-
tion with her family. 41 These considerations were sufficient for awarding 
custody to the husband. 42 In addition, the court noted that the two older 
children preferred to consider their father's home as their own. 43 The 
childrens' best interests would be served by minimizing sibling separation. 44 
Because the Court of Appeals considered the best interests of the youngest 
child to have been properly assessed by the trial court, the later court's judg-
ment was affirmed. 45 
The decision in Fort, that it is not improper to award custody of a minor 
child to a parent who cohabits with an unmarried person, is consistent with 
at least two other child custody proceedings argued during the Survey year. 
In Bouchard v. Bouchard, 46 the Massachusetts Appeals Court emphasized 
that the governing principle regarding the determination of custodial ar-
rangements is the welfare of the child. 47 In this regard, the court will not 
sustain a custody award unless all relevant factors have been weighed solely 
in terms of the child's well-being. 48 A custody award cannot be sustained 
simply upon the ground that the custodial parent violated a statute without 
evidence demonstrating an adverse effect of such behavior on the child.49 
Instead, the determination should rest upon the relative advantages of the 
respective parental environments. 50 Similarly, in Kelly v. Kelly, 51 the court 
concluded that the child's welfare would best be served by granting custody 
to the mother despite the fact that she cohabited in the home with an un-
married man. 52 According to the court, the crucial issue is not the possible 
criminality of the custodial parent's conduct but rather the best interests of 
the child's welfare. 53 The court noted that there was little evidence regarding 
the effect that such a relationship had on the welfare of the child. 54 In par-
41 /d. 
42 /d. 
43 /d. 
44 /d. 
4l /d. 
46 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1272, 422 N.E.2d at 471. 
47 Hersey v. Hersey, 271 Mass. 545, 555, 171 N.E. 815, 820 (1930); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 304 
Mass. 248,250,23 N.E.2d 405,406 (1939); Heard v. Heard, 323 Mass. 357, 375-77, 82 N.E.2d 
219, 231 (1948); Stevens v. Stevens, 337 Mass. 625, 627, 151 N.E.2d 166, 167 (1958); Clifford 
v. Clifford, 354 Mass. 545, 548,238 N.E.2d 522, 524 (1%8); Vilakazi v. Maxie, 371 Mass. 406, 
409, 357 N.E.2d 763, 765 (1976); Masters v. Craddock, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428, 351 N.E.2d 
217, 218-19 (1976). 
41 Haas v. Puchalski, 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 741, 742 n.5, 402 N.E.2d 1088, 1089 
n.5. 
49 Tolos v. Tolos, 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 807,809,419 N.E.2d 304, 306-07. 
•• Heard v. Heard, 323 Mass. at 377, 82 N.E.2d at 201. 
" 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 16ll, 425 N.E.2d at 760. 
" /d. at 1612, 425 N.E.2d at 760-61. 
" Id. at 1613, 425 N.E.2d at 761-62. 
l4 /d. 
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ticular, the court found that the relationship had not caused the child any 
emotional harm nor had any harmful tendency for the future. 55 The court, 
therefore, sustained custody with the wife. 56 
§ 3.5. Separation and Divorce-Removal of Minor Children from the 
Commonwealth by the Custodial Parent.* In many jurisdictions, the best 
interests of the child determine whether the custodial parent will be allowed· 
to remove a minor child from the state. 1 The best interest standard, 
however, varies from state to state, depending on the factors the courts con-
sider relevant in determining the child's best interests. 2 Illustrative of this 
variation is the extent to which the courts consider the interests of the 
custodial parent in determining the best interests of the child for the pur-
poses of removal from the state. In some jurisdictions, the interests of the 
child are considered apart from the interests of the custodial parent, the 
courts requiring that the move be shown to benefit the child. 3 In other 
jurisdictions, removal of the child will be allowed if the custodial parent has 
a legitimate reason consistent with the best interests of the child. 4 In yet 
other jurisdictions, "decisions of the custodial parent reasonably made in a 
good faith attempt to fulfill the responsibility imposed by the award of 
custody" are presumed to have been made in the best interests of the child. 5 
During the Survey year, the Massachusetts Appeals Court, in Hale v. 
Hale, 6 addressed the issue of whether in decisions involving removal of a 
minor child from the state the interests of the custodial parent should be 
taken into account in determining the best interests of the child. In Hale, a 
mother filed a motion in~probate court seeking leave to remove her two 
" Id. 
"Id. 
* Pamela M. Donna, staff member, ANNifAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 3.5 'See, e.g., Bernick v. Bernick, 31 Colo. App. 485, 487-88, 505 P.2d 14, 15-16 (1972); 
Arquilla v. Arquilla, 85 Ill. App.3d 1090, 1093, 407 N.E.2d 948, 950 (1980); D'Onofrio v. 
D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200,204,365 A.2d 27,29 (Ch. Div.), aff'dpercuriam, 144 N.J. 
Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (App. Div. 1976). See also H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 
587 (1968) and 1 A. LINDEY, ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS AND SEPARATION AGREEMENTS§ 14-82 
(1978). 
' Hale v. Hale, 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2117, 2122 n.7, 429 N.E.2d 340, 343 n.7. 
' See, e.g., Meier v. Meier, 286 Or. 437, 447-48, 595 P.2d 474, 479 (1979); Fritschler v. 
Fritschler, 60 Wis.2d 283, 287-88, 208 N.W.2d 336, 339 (1973). 
• Jafari v. Jafari, 204 Neb. 622,624,284 N.W.2d 554, 555 (1979); In re Ehlen, 303 N.W.2d 
808, 810 (S.D. 1981). 
' Bernick v. Bernick, 31 Colo. App. 485, 487-88, 505 P.2d 14, 15-16 (1972). In the view of 
the Colorado Court of Appeals in Bernick, the responsibility imposed by the award of custody 
includes the custodial parent's responsibility to select the environment in which the children 
will be raised, to select the manner in which to raise them, and to provide the children with an 
opportunity to benefit from a relationship with the noncustodial parent through adequate 
visitation. Id. at 505 P.2d at 15. 
' 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2117, 429 N.E.2d 340. 
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minor children from the state. 7 The facts in the record revealed that the 
mother, who believed that the move would be advantageous to the children, 
had several reasons for desiring to move to California. 8 First, she wished to 
live near her sister and her sister's family. 9 Second, she believed that she 
would be able to provide better living conditions for herself and her 
children. 1° Finally, she considered her job in Massachusetts very demanding 
and a "dead end."" A career civil servant, she was eligible for a transfer to 
an office in California. 12 Although her salary would remain about the same, 
the transfer would allow her to change careers and work in a less pressured 
atmosphere. 13 
The record further revealed that the husband opposed the move. 14 
Although at one time he had not seen the children often, he now had an 
"excellent relationship" with them and visited his minor daughters 
weekly." The minor children, ages nine and thirteen, testified that they 
wanted to remain in Massachusetts, near their father, older sister, and 
school friends. 16 The probate judge prohibited the wife from removing the 
minor children to California. 17 
The wife appealed, and the Appeals Court reversed the probate judge's 
denial of the wife's motion for leave to remove the children from the state 
' Id. at 2117,429 N.E.2d at 341. A third child, who was not a minor, lived with the father. 
ld. at 2119, 429 N.E.2d at 342. 
The mother, who had been separated from her husband since 1972, also sought separate sup-
port.Id. at 2217-18,429 N.E.2d at 341. Removal of minor children of divorced parents by the 
custodial parent is governed by statute in Massachusetts. G.L. c. 208, § 30 provides 
A minor child of divorced parents who is a native of or has resided five years within 
this commonwealth and over whose custody and maintenance the superior court or a 
probate court has jurisdiction shall not, if of suitable age to signify his consent, be 
removed out of this commonwealth without such consent, or, if under that age, without 
the consent of both parents, unless the court upon cause shown otherwise orders. The 
court, upon application of any person in behalf of such child, may require security and 
issue writs and processes to effect the purposes of this ... section. 
The statute also applies to separate support proceedings. 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2120 
n.4, 429 N.E.2d at 342-43 n.4. 
' Id. at 2118-19, 429 N.E.2d at 341-42. 
• Id. at 2118, 429 N.E.2d at 341. 
10 ld. 
II Jd, 
" ld. at 2118, 429 N.E.2d at 341-42. 
" Id. at 2118-19, 429 N.E.2d at 341-42. 
•• Id. at 2119, 429 N.E.2d at 342. 
" Id. The husband continued his education after his retirement from the Air Force in 1975. 
Id. at 2118-19, 429 N.E.2d at 341-42. At that time, his children were on welfare and he saw 
them infrequently./d. at 2119,429 N.E.2d at 342. At the time of the hearing, the husband was 
employed. ld. 
"Id. 
" Id. at 2117-18, 429 N.E.2d at 341. The judge also awarded the wife custody of these 
children. Id. at 2117, 429 N.E.2d at 341. Custody itself was not in dispute. Id. at n.l. 
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and remanded the case for further proceedings. 11 The Appeals Court noted 
that, from what it could ascertain, the probate judge had denied the motion 
on the ground that the move would make visitation more difficult!' The 
court observed that in its view the fact that visitation would be more dif-
ficult was not controlling. 20 Instead, the Appeals Court established that 
"[t]he best interests of children for purposes of deciding whether to permit 
removal are also interwoven with the well being of the custodial parent, and 
the determination, therefore, requires that the interests of the [custodial 
parent] also be taken into account. " 21 
After establishing that in removal decisions the interests of the custodial 
parent must be considered in determining the best interests of the child, the 
court reviewed Massachusetts law. First, the court focused upon 
Massachusetts General Laws chapter 208, section 30,22 which governs re-
moval. This statute provides, in relevant part, that if the courts of this state 
have jurisdiction over the custody of a minor child of divorced parents, the 
child shall not be removed from this state "without the consent of both 
parents, unless the court upon cause shown otherwise orders. " 23 The Ap-
peals Court observed that although the "upon cause shown" requirement 
of the statute has been interpreted as permitting removal if removal is in the 
child's best interests, 24 the decisional law had not yet established criteria for 
determining the child's best interests. 25 Instead, trial court decisions on 
removal had been upheld without much discussion. 26 
Second, the court noted that in a recent case involving visitation, Felton 
v. Felton, 27 the Supreme Judicial Court had discussed the meaning of best 
interests ''when the parents are at odds'' and the attainment of best interests 
"involves 'some li.initation of the liberties of one or the other of the 
parents.' " 21 The Hale court noted that the Felton Court had observed that 
" Id. at 2118, 429 N.E.2d at 341. 
" ld. at 2120, 429 N.E.2d at 342. 
20 ld. 
21 ld. 
22 ld. 
23 ld. n.4. For the text of this statute see note 7 supra. 
24 ld. at 2120, 429 N.E.2d at 342-43 (citing Rubin v. Rubin, 370 Mass. 857, 346 N.E.2d 919 
(1976)). For a discussion of Rubin, see Inker, Perocchi, & Walsh, Domestic Relations, 1976 
ANN. SURv. MASS. LAW§ 4.8, at 91-93. 
" 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2120-21, 429 N.E.2d at 343. 
" ld. at 2121, 429 N.E.2d at 343 (citing Colopy v. Colopy, 348 Mass. 781, 203 N.E.2d 546 
(1964); Keiter v. Keiter, 357 Mass. 772,258 N.E.2d 778 (1970); Rubin v. Rubin, 370 Mass. 857, 
346 N.E.2d 919 (1976)). 
27 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 779, 418 N.E.2d 606. 
21 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2121,429 N.E.2d at 343 (quoting Felton v. Felton, 1981 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 779, 780-81, 418 N.E.2d 606, 607). In Felton, the custodial parent objected to 
the religious instruction the noncustodial parent was providing the children during visitation. 
ld. at 779, 418 N.E.2d at 606. The lower court modified the visitation provisions of an earlier 
32
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1981 [1981], Art. 6
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1981/iss1/6
§ 3.5 DOMESTIC RELATIONS 89 
assumptions that the child would be harmed were not sufficient; instead, 
there must be facts actually demonstrating harm. 29 In the Hale court's view, 
since significant parent-child relationships were also affected by decisions 
concerning removal, in these latter decisions the approach of the Supreme 
Judicial Court in Felton should be applied. 30 Thus, the Hale court indicated 
that comprehensive findings should be made and that the child's best in-
terests would be served "by an accommodation 'which intrudes least on the 
liberties of either parent and is yet compatible with the health of the 
child.' " 31 
After finding that Massachusetts law did not clearly define best interests 
in the removal context, the Hale court evaluated the approaches other 
jurisdictions have taken in determining the best interests of the child in deci-
sions concerning removal of a child from the state. 32 Noting that the cases 
varied considerably, the court observed that this variation resulted from the 
factors different courts considered significant, rather than from the dif-
ferences in the language of the statutes involved. 33 Thus, in some jurisdic-
tions, decisions of the custodial parent reasonably made in good faith were 
presumed to have been made in the best interests of the child. 34 In other 
jurisdictions, the custodial parent would be allowed to remove the child 
from the state if the parent had a legitimate reason for the move consistent 
with the child's best interests. 35 In yet others, a showing. that the move 
benefited the child, rather than the parent, was required before removal 
would be allowed. 36 
The Hale court observed that its decision that the well being of the 
custodial parent should be taken into account in determining the best in-
terests of the child was heavily influenced by the reasoning of the New 
judgment by barring the father's visitation unless he refrained from giving the children 
religious instruction. Id. at 779-80, 418 N.E.2d at 606. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed 
the judgment of modification and remanded the case to the trial court, noting that the 
custodial parent could seek modification if she provided evidence of harm to the child which 
was missing from the present record. Id. at 789,418 N.E.2d at 610-11. 
29 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2121, 429 N.E.2d at 343 (citing Felton v. Felton, 1981 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 779, 787, 418 N.E.2d 606, 610). 
•• 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2121-22, 429 N.E.2d at 343. 
" /d. (quoting Felton v. Felton, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 779, 782, 418 N.E.2d 606, 608). 
" 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2122 & n.7, 429 N.E.2d at 343 & n.7. 
" /d. Some states do not have statutes governing removal. 
,. Id. (citing Bernick v. Bernick, 31 Colo. App. 485,487-88, 505 P.2d 14, 15-16 (1972)). For 
a fuller explanation of this standard, see text and note at note 5 supra. 
" 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2122 n.7, 429 N.E.2d at 343 n.7 (citing Jafari v. Jafari, 
204 Neb. 622, 624, 284 N.W.2d 554, 555 (1979); In re Ehlen, 303 N.W.2d 808, 810 (S.D. 
1981)). 
" 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2122 n.7, 429 N.E.2d at 343 n.7 (citing Meier v. Meier, 
286 Or. 437, 447-48, 595 P.2d 474, 479 (1979); Fritschler v. Fritschler, 60 Wis.2d 283, 287-88, 
208 N.W.2d 336, 339 (1973)). 
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Jersey Superior Court in D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio. 37 The D'Onofrio court 
had recognized the importance to the child of the custodial parent's well be-
ing. 38 This recognition, the Hale court observed, was consistent with 
psychological studies finding that the well being of children of divorced or 
separated parents was closely interwoven with the well being of the 
custodial parent. 39 
After finding support for its construction of the Massachusetts statute 
governing removal in the D'Onofrio court's construction of a similar 
statute, the Hale court indicated the factors which should be weighed in 
deciding whether removal of minor children from the state should be al-
lowed. The court established that the prospective advantageous effects of 
the move on the custodial parent's and the children's quality of life should 
be considered. 40 In addition, the motives of the custodial parent should be 
considered to determine whether the move was primarily motivated by a 
desire to frustrate visitation by the other parent. 41 The likelihood of the 
custodial parent's compliance with visitation orders intended to preserve the 
child's relationship with the noncustodial parent should also be considered, 
" 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2122, 429 N.E.2d at 343 (citing D'Onofrio v. 
D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 365 A.2d 27 (Ch. Div.), a.ff'd per curiam, 144 N.J. Super. 
352, 365 A.2d 716 (App. Div. 1976)). The Hale court noted that the New Jersey statute govern-
ing removal of minor children without consent of the noncustodial parent was almost identical 
to the Massachusetts statute governing removal. 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2122, 429 
N .E.2d at 343-44 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-2 (West 1976)). The Hale court, noting that the 
D'Onofrio court had analyzed the differences between the child's relationship to the custodial 
parent and the child's relationship to the noncustodial parent, quoted D'Onofrio at length. 
1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2122-23,429 N.E.2d at 344. The D'Onofrio court had noted, 
first, that a parent-child relationship maintained by visitation was "inevitably" different from 
that possible when parent and child lived together. /d. at 2122, 429 N.E.2d at 344 (quoting 
D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200,205, 365 A.2d 27,29 (Ch. Div. 1976)). Second, 
the D'Onofrio court had observed that the children's daily routines, the "quality of their en-
vironment," and their lifestyle were that ofthe custodial parent./d. at 2122-23,429 N.E.2d at 
344 (quoting D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 205-06, 365 A.2d 27, 29 (Ch. Div. 
1976)). Third, the custodial parent and the children formed a new family unit, and what was 
advantageous to that unit as a whole, to its members individually and to the way in which the 
new family unit functioned as a whole was in the best interests of the child. /d. at 2123, 429 
N.E.2d at 344 (quoting D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144N.J. Super. 200,206,365 A.2d 27,29-30 
(Ch. Div. 1976)). 
Courts in other jurisdictions have also been influenced by D'Onofrio. See, e.g., Gallagher v. 
Gallaher, 60 Ill. App.3d 26, 31, 376 N.E.2d 279, 282-83 (1978); Watters v. Watters, 112 Mich. 
App. 1, 12-14, 314 N.W.2d 778, 782-83 (Mich. App. 1981). 
" 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2122-23, 429 N.E.2d at 344 (quoting D'Onofrio v. 
D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 365 A.2d 27 (Ch. Div. 1976)). 
" 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2124 n.8, 429 N.E.2d at 345 n.8. 
•• Id. at 2123, 429 N.E.2d at 344 (quoting D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 
206, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (Ch. Div. 1976)). 
41 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2123, 429 N.E.2d at 344 (quoting D'Onofrio v. 
D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 206, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (Ch. Div. 1976)). 
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as should the possibility of substituting longer visits during the year or sum-
mer for weekly visits. 42 Maintaining weekly visitation by the noncustodial 
parent was not, in itself, the court observed, a sufficient ground for denying 
removal. 43 
After delineating the factors to be weighed in determining the child's best 
interests, the Hale court remanded the case to the trial court for further con-
sideration. 44 In remanding the case, the Hale court noted that the trial court 
had considered one important factor, the children's need for weekly visita-
tion by the noncustodial parent. 4 ' The court observed, however, that it was 
unable to discern whether the judge had considered other factors which 
were "perhaps even more important" to the children's best interests. 46 
These factors included the move's advantages for the emotional well being 
of the new family unit as a whole, and "the emotional costs of forcing a 
stressful family and career choice, if such be the case, on the parent having 
the primary responsibility for the day-to-day care of the children. " 47 In ad-
dition, the court observed that alternative visiting schedules that would be 
adequate to preserve the children's relationship with the noncustodial 
parent should be considered, as should the possibility of reducing support 
payments to cover increased visitation expenses. 41 Finally, the court noted 
that although the childen had testified that they preferred to remain in 
Massachusetts, "the preferences of children of these ages must be treated 
with caution. " 49 
The court's decision in Hale directs the trial courts to consider the 
custodial parent's well being in determining the best interests of the child 
for purposes of removal of the child from the state. This decision is to be 
welcomed as an effort to deal with one of the more difficult problems 
" 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2123-24, 429 N.E.2d at 344 (quoting D'Onofrio v. 
D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 206-07, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (Ch. Div. 1976)). See Note, 
Residence Restrictions on Custodial Parents: Implications for the Right to Travel, 12 RUT. L. 
J. 340, 353-59 (1981) [hereinafter referred to as Note, Residence Restrictions] suggesting that 
enactment of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in a great majority of states and 
enactment of the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 provide mechanisms for 
enforcing visitation provisions of a court decree outside the forum state and thus may eliminate 
uncertainty concerning compliance with visitation rights. Forty-seven states have enacted the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. See Foster & Freed, Divorce in the Fifty States: An 
Overview as of August 1, 1981, 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4049, 4061. Massachusetts has not 
enacted the act, but the courts apply principles of the Act. /d. 
•• 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh·. at 2123, 429 N.E.2d at 344 (quoting D'Onofrio v. 
D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 207, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (Ch. Div. 1976)). 
•• 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2126, 429 N.E.2d at 345. 
•• /d. at 2125, 429 N.E.2d at 345 . 
•• /d. 
41 /d . 
•• /d . 
•• /d. 
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generated by the increasing mobility of our society50 and its high divorce 
rate. By including the well being of the custodial parent as well as the 
possibility of alternative visitation schedules among the factors to be con-
sidered in determining the child's best interests, the court has attempted to 
balance the conflicting interests of the parents. In addition, the court has at-
tempted to balance the child's needs for continuity in custody, 51 on the one 
hand, and for maintaining a relationship with the noncustodial parent, on 
the other. 52 The approach is more realistic than that taken by courts which 
require that direct benefit to the child, rather than to the parent, be shown 
before removal will be permitted. 53 As one court observed in rejecting the 
direct benefit to the child rule, many custodial parents would be un-
necessarily tied to the state, since "a child often receives little, if any, 
demonstrable benefit from moving .... " 54 Thus, the Hale court's decision 
avoids imposing on the custodial parent a burden of proof which would be 
difficult to meet. 
The /lale court's decision to reject interference with frequent visitation as 
a sufficient ground for prohibiting the custodial parent from removing the 
child from the state also potentially spares the custodial parent difficult 
choices. Career opportunities for the custodial parent or his or her current 
spouse may well lie in another state." If maintaining frequent visitation 
with the noncustodial parent is made the determinative factor in decisions 
concerning removal, however, the custodial parent may have to forego a 
better job or a promotion in order to remain in the state and retain custody 
of the child. The custodial parent may also be forced to choose between re-
taining custody of th~ child by staying in the state or losing custody by mov-
ing out of the state with a current spouse whose career requires it. 56 
•• See, e.g., In reMarriage of Lower, 269 N.W.2d 823, 826 (Iowa 1979) (noting that it is 
unrealistic to demand that custodial parents remain in one location during the children's 
minority, since men and women are subject to job transfers and should be free to go where 
their opportunities lie). But see Fritschler v. Fritschler, 60 Wis.2d 283, 288-89, 208 N.W.2d 
336, 339 (1973) (rights of other parent limit the custodial parent's right to move about freely). 
" See R. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeter-
minacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 264-65 (1975). 
" See, e.g., Bernick v. Bernick, 31 Colo. App. 485, SOS P.2d 14, 15 (1972). 
" For cases requiring direct benefit to the child see note 3 supra. 
54 In reMarriage of Burgham, 86 Ill. App.3d 341, 346, 408 N.E.2d 37, 40 (1980). 
" See, e.g., Arquilla v. Arquilla, 85 Ill. App.3d 1090, 1091, 407 N.E.2d 948, 949 (1980); In 
reMarriage of Lower, 269N.W.2d 822, 824 (Iowa 1978); Nedrowv. Nedrow, 48 Wash.2d 243, 
292 P.2d 872, 875 (1956). 
" Cf Daghir v. Daghir, 82 A.D.2d 191, 196, 441 N.Y.S.2d 494, 497 (1981) (career of cur-
rent spouse did not require the move but that spouse had accepted a two year transfer to 
France). One court, in referring to the Daghir court's order prohibiting removal and ordering a 
transfer of custody should the custodial parent decide to leave the state, described the custodial 
parent's choice as a "Hobson's choice." Jordan v. Jordan, 50 Md. App. 285, _, 439 A.2d 
26, 32 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (rejecting an approach which would require a custodial 
parent to choose between her fiance and her children). 
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Although the Hale court wisely rejected interference with frequent visita-
tion as a sufficient ground for denying removal, it recognized the impor-
tance of preserving the child's relationship with the noncustodial parent. 57 
The Hale court sought to protect this interest by requiring that alternatives 
to once a week visitation be considered. 58 In doing so, the court refused to 
simply assume harm to the child from less frequent, but longer periods of 
visitation. Rather, the court recognized that, " '[i]t is at least arguable, and 
the literature does not suggest otherwise,' " that longer visits several times a 
year may do more to foster the relationship of the child and the non-
custodial parent than does the typical weekly visit. H 
The court's decision in Hale signals a changed treatment for removal 
cases. Although a best interests of the child standard will continue to govern 
these cases, the court has set forth factors to be considered in determining 
the child's best interests. By establishing these factors, the Appeals Court 
has indicated that trial court decisions concerning removal will no longer be 
routinely upheld as long as any reasonable ground for the decision appears 
in the record. After Hale, in determining whether to allow removal, a court 
must consider the well being of the custodial parent60 as well as the advan-
tages of the move for the custodial parent and the children. 61 A court must 
also consider the integrity of the motives underlying the custodial parent's 
desire to move. 62 In addition, a court must consider whether alternative 
visitation schedules would adequately preserve the child's relationship with 
the noncustodial parent. 63 Considered together, these factors suggest that if 
the custodial parent has concrete, well motivated reasons for the move, such 
as a specific career opportunity, better living conditions or proximity to 
relatives, removal of a minor child from the state is likely to be permitted as 
long as some visitation between the child and the noncustodial parent is 
possible. 64 
" 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2123-24, 429 N.E.2d at 344. 
" /d. at 2123, 429 N.E.2d at 344. 
" /d. at 2123-24, 429 N.E.2d at 344. (quoting D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 
200, 207, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (Ch. Div. 1976)). But see Daghir v. Daghir, 82 A.D.2d 191, 194,441 
N.Y.S.2d 494, 496 (1981) (to be meaningful visitation must be regular and frequent). 
•• 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2120, 429 N.E.2d at 342. 
" /d. at 2123, 429 N.E.2d at 344. 
62 /d . 
.. /d. 
64 Removal cases may also raise the issue of whether prohibiting removal infringes on the 
constitutionality protected right to travel. The Hale court noted that because its approach to 
the issue of removal sought to restrict the liberties of either parent as little as possible while 
protecting the child's interests, it need not address constitutional questions raised by the wife. 
Id. at 2122 & 2122 n.6, 429 N.E.2d at 343 & 343 n.6. For a discussion of the constitutional 
questions, see Note, Residence Restrictions, supra note 42, at 341. 
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§ 3.6. Visitation Rights-Conflict of Religious Instruction.* Courts have 
consistently recognized that parents have the freedom of religious belief and 
may shape their familial relationships according to these beliefs. 1 This liber-
ty may be limited, however, in situations where the best interests of the child 
would not be promoted by such expressions of belief. 2 In particular, this 
conflict may arise subsequent to divorce where the parents wish to educate 
their children in different religious traditions. During the Survey year, the 
Supreme Judicial Court set forth guidelines for resolving this issue. 
In Felton v. Felton, 3 the Supreme Judicial Court reviewed a judgment of 
the Probate Court modifying the visitation provisions of a divorce judg-
ment. 4 The mother of two children sought the modification, alleging that 
the father's attempts during visitation periods to indoctrinate the children in 
the Jehovah's Witness faith confused and disoriented the children such that 
they became alienated from their mother.' The Probate Court issued an 
order which allowed the father to visit his children only if he refrained from 
instructing the children in his religion. 6 The Supreme Judicial Court re-
versed the Probate Court's decision, concluding that it was clearly errone-
ous for the trial judge to find, from the facts in the record, that the father's 
religious instruction of the children had a deleterious effect on them. 7 
The parties in Felton, Diane and Wayne Felton, were married in Septem-
ber, 1967.' The Feltons had two children, Deborah and Jennifer, born in 
1971 and 1974 respectively. 9 In April, 1976, pursuant to an informal agree-
ment, Wayne and Diane separated. 10 The two minor children continued to 
live with Diane, but Wayne retained liberal visitation rights. 11 On June 1, 
* Kevin J. Lake, staff member, ANNuAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW. 
§ 3.6. ' See infra text at note 31. 
' See infra accompanying text at notes 32-34. 
' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 779, 418 N.E.2d 606. 
• Id. at 779-80, 418 N.E.2d at 606-07. 
' Id. at 779, 418 N.E.2d at 606. 
• Id. at 779-80, 418 N.E.2d at 606-07. 
' Id. The Supreme Judicial Court, therefore, reversed the findings of the trial judge. The 
case would be remanded; upon the mother's election, for further development and considera-
tion of the physical and emotional consequences of the father's actions upon the children. ld. 
at 780, 418 N.E.2d at 607. The issue to be litigated on remand would be whether there has been 
a change in the circumstances in the two years after the trial judge issued the original modifica-
tion order./d. at 789-90, 418 N.E.2d at 611. 
1 /d. at 783, 418 N.B:2d at 608. 
'Id. 
10 ld. 
" Id. Wayne's visitation rights, as appearing in the agreement were: "a. Between 9:00A.M. 
and S:OO P.M. b. Alternate. Saturdays and Sundays. c. One weekend per month. d. One week 
during the year, both children~for vacation. e. Holidays and birthdays on an alternate basis." 
/d. at 783 n.4, 418 N.E.2d at 608 n.4. 
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1977 ,·a divorce judgment nisi granted custody and visitation rights to the 
litigants on a similar basis. 12 
Prior to the separation, both parents and the children had attended the 
Congregational Church. 13 Shortly after the separation, however, Wayne 
became interested in the Jehovah's Witnesses, a Protestant sect of funda-
mentalist doctrine which strictly adheres to the Biblical texts. 14 In Decem-
ber, 1977, the divorce judgment became final and Wayne married Gail, a 
Jehovah's Witness." In May, 1978, Wayne was baptized into his new 
faith. 16 
The Jehovah's Witness doctrine required Wayne to instruct his children 
in his religion with emphasis on a strict and literal interpretation of the Bi-
ble.17 In this regard, the Jehovah's Witness belief forbids recognition of 
birthdays, holidays and childhood fantasies such as the tooth fairy and San-
ta Claus. 18 In April, 1978, Wayne and Gail attended a family convention of 
Jehovah's Witnesses with the children. 19 As a result of these beliefs and ac-
tivities, Diane refused to permit further visitation and restricted Wayne's 
contact with the children to weekly telephone conversations. 10 According to 
Diane, the Jehovah's Witness' disregard for birthdays and holidays con-
flicted with her Congregational beliefs. 11 In addition, Diane claimed that 
Wayne's Bible readings were too strict and literal to be well-suited for 
young children, 11 and that their attendance at the Jehovah's Witness con-
vention was improper .13 Diane also felt that Wayne's beliefs adversely af-
fected his "knowing" the children. 14 Finally, Diane concluded from the 
elder daughter's reluctance to relate the particularities of her visit with her 
father, that she was upset and confused. ll 
After Diane refused to allow visitation, Wayne initiated contempt pr~­
ceedings against Diane. 16 Diane responded by seeking modification of the 
" /d. at 783, 418 N.E.2d at 608. 
" /d. 
" The Court notes that this definition of the Jehovah's Witness faith "might not accord 
with a theologian's description." ld. at 783 n.S, 418 N.E.2d at 608 n.S. 
" /d. at 783, 418 N.E.2d at 608. 
16 /d. 
" /d. at 785, 418 N.E.2d at 609. 
II /d . 
., Id. at 784, 418 N.E.2d at 609. 
20 /d. 
21 /d. 
22 /d. 
23 /d. 
24 /d. 
25 /d. 
26 /d. 
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visitation rights under the divorce judgment. 27 Pursuant to a pretrial con-
ference, the probate judge suspended Wayne's visitation rights by means of 
an interim order. 21 Subsequently, a judgment granted Wayne visitation 
rights of his two minor children, at reasonable times, provided that "he 
refrains from giving his children any religious training or education which 
shall be in conflict or contrary with the religious training and beliefs of the 
custodial parent." 29 
In reversing the judgment of the Probate Court, 30 Justice Kaplan, writing 
the opinion of the court, articulated the standard to be applied in cases 
where a divorced parent's religious indoctrination of his child is alleged to 
cause harm to the child. Justice Kaplan recognized that a parent's freedom 
of religious expression generally includes the right of the parent to direct the 
religious upbringing of his children. 31 He maintained, however, that the 
parent's right of religious instruction may be limited in certain cases in 
order to promote the "best interests" of the children. 32 Such cases could ex-
ist only where it has been proven that the children have been harmed as a 
result of conflicting religious instruction or practice. 33 The harm to the 
child, according to Justice Kaplan, must be a "substantial injury, physical 
or emotional, which will have a like harmful tendency for the future.",. 
Moreover, harm to the children may not be "assumed" or "surmised" by 
the Probate Court. 35 The record must show that the moving party has 
"demonstrated in detail" that conflicting religious instruction has, in fact, 
harmed the children. 36 Even where the moving party has sustained its 
burden, the Probate Court's order must be narrowly tailored so that it "in-
trudes least on the religious inclinations of either parent and is yet compat-
ible with the health Of the child." 37 
If the primary objective of custodial determinations is the child's best in-
terests, 38 the Court notes that exposure of the child to a single religion re-
gardless of the parental liberties might be seen to best promote a policy of 
" ld. 
" ld. 
29 [d. 
•• The Supreme Judicial Court, on its own initiative, ordered direct appellate review of the 
case and unanimously reversed the judgment of the Probate Court. ld. at 780, 418 N.E.2d at 
607. 
" ld. 
" Id. 
" ld. at 781, 418 N.E.2d at 607. 
•• !d. at 782, 418 N.E.2d at 608. 
" ld . 
.. ld. 
"Id. 
" ld. at 781-82, 418 N.E.2d at 607-08; Vilakazi v. Maxie, 371 Mass. 406, 409, 357 N.E.2d 
763, 765 (1976). 
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. stability and repose. 39 Justice Kaplan observed, however, that exposure to 
the divergent religious practices and beliefs of both parents ordinarily 
should be encouraged. 40 A child's "frequent and continuing contact" with 
both parents and their individual religious inclinations can be a valuable ex-
perience in child development. 41 In addition, the Court considered it impor-
tant to expose the child to various religious models between which he may 
later choose. 42 Furthermore, the Court noted that exposure to diverse reli-
gious faiths may be a good stimulus for a child. 43 
The Court recommended that evidence of how a child's "general 
demeanor, attitude, school work, appetite, health or outlook has been af-
fected ... " 44 by the mental conflict may be influential in seeking modifi-
cation of a custody award. 45 Such evidence can be supported by church, 
school, medical, or psychiatric authorities, as well as the child's as-
sociates. 46 In addition, a court appointed investigator could lessen the im-
pact of the self-serving testimonies offered by the father and mother. 47 
Applying the standards articulated to the facts in this case, the Court 
found error in the judge's determination that the father's religious instruc-
tions and influence deleteriously affected the children and undermined the 
custodial relationship. 48 In this regard, the Felton Court noted an insuffi-
ciency of evidence relating to such basic matters as the precise manner of 
Wayne's Bible instructions. 4' In addition, evidence concerning the elder 
daughter's physical and emotional condition or any causal connection be-
tween such condition and her father's behavior was non-existent. 50 The 
Court noted that general contradictory testimony that the child was upset or 
confused was insufficient to establish such a causal connection. 51 Further-
,. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 781-82, 418 N.E.2d at 607-08 . 
•• /d. 
" /d.; In re Marriage of Murga, 103 Cal. App. 3d 498, 504-05, 163 Cal. Rptr. 79, 81-82 
(1980) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code§ 4600 (West 1981)). 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 781-82, 418 N.E.2d at 607-08. 
" /d. See also Smith v. Smith, 90 Ariz. 190, 194, 367 P.2d 320, 324 (1961). 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 789, 418 N.E.2d at 611 (quoting Pope v. Pope, 267 S.W.2d 340, 
343 (Mo. App. 1954)). 
" /d . 
.. /d. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 789,418 N.E.2d at 611. A qualified investigator would inquire as 
to the facts, render a report, and be available for examination. Id. See also Gilmore v. 
Gilmore, 369 Mass. 589, 603-06, 341 N.E.2d 655, 659 (1976); Jones v. Jones, 349 Mass. 259, 
264-65, 207 N.E.2d 922, 926 (1965); G.L. c. 215, § 56A. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 787, 418 N.E.2d at 610. 
" /d. at 786-87, 418 N.E.2d at 609-10. 
,. /d. 
" /d. at 787, 418 N.E.2d at 610. See Compton v. Gilmore, 98 Idaho 190, 191-92, 560 P.2d 
861-62 (1977); Goodman v. Goodman, 180 Neb. 83, 88-89, 114 N.W.2d 445, 448 (1966); 
Munoz v. Munoz, 79 Wash.2d 810, 814, 489 P.2d 1133, 1135 (1971); Robertson v. Robertson, 
19 Wash. App. 425, 427-28, 575 P.2d 1092, 1095 (1978). 
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more, the Court found that the Probate Court's error resulted from an ap-
parent predisposition of the judge. 52 The probate judge had assumed that 
religious differences by themselves would have such a detrimental effect on 
the children as to require censorship. 53 The Court was not convinced, how-
ever, that "duality of religious beliefs, per se, creates a conflict upon young 
minds." 54 The Felton Court, therefore, reversed the judgment appealed 
from and remanded the case, upon the mother's election, for the probate 
judge to consider under appropriate evidence whether an order modifying 
the original visitation provisions was required. 55 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 787, 418 N.E.2d at 610. 
" /d. 
,. /d. (quoting Munoz v. Munoz, 79 Wash.2d 810, 815, 489 P.2d 1133, 1135 (1971)). See 
also In re Marriaae of Murga, 103 Cal. App.3d 498, 504-06, 163 Cal. Rptr. 79, 81-82 (1980); 
Robertson v. Robertson, 19 Wash. App. 425,427, 575 P.2d 1092, 1093 (1978); Lewis v. Lewis, 
260 Ark. 691, 693, 543 S.W.2d 222, 223-24 (1976). 
ss 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 779-80, 418 N.E.2d at 606-m. 
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